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INTRODUCTION 
ick your statistic: in the United States, every nine seconds a 
woman is physically abused.1  The Department of Justice 
concluded that between 1998 and 2002, of the almost 3.5 million 
violent crimes committed against family members, forty-nine percent 
of these were crimes against spouses.2  In a 1995–1996 study 
conducted in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, nearly 25% 
of women and 7.6% of men were raped and/or physically assaulted by 
a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner, or dating 
partner/acquaintance at some time in their lifetime (based on a survey 
of 16,000 participants, equally male and female).3  Despite a dramatic 
increase in awareness over the past twenty years, the problem seems 
intractable.4 
It’s time that responses to domestic violence reach beyond criminal 
and family law, using both a systemic approach and invoking the 
law’s expressive function to intervene across the legal spectrum.  This 
Article reaches into the realm of succession law to propose that 
evidence of spousal abuse should raise a presumption of duress that 
would, unless rebutted, bar the abuser from inheriting under the 
victim’s will and through nonprobate transfers.  I also argue that 
spousal abuse should bar inheritance under intestacy in the very 
frequent cases in which a decedent does not leave a will.  Unlike the 
few previous articles that have covered this topic in passing, this one 
proposes a complete ban—that is, on inheritance under a will, a will 
 
1 Violence Against Women: Data & Statistics, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/emstrauma/vaw/data_stats.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  
For books that collect statistics on domestic violence in general, see MICHELE HARWAY & 
MARSALI HANSEN, SPOUSE ABUSE: ASSESSING & TREATING BATTERED WOMEN, 
BATTERERS, & THEIR CHILDREN 27 (1994). 
2 Domestic Violence Assault, WHOCANISUE.COM, http://personal-injury-assault-and       
-battery.whocanisue.com/domestic-assault (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
3 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE iii (2000), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm. 
4 EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 
362–63 (2007) (noting the failure of reforms since the 1980s to make significant inroads 
into the problem). 
P
SPIVACK 10/28/2011  10:34 AM 
2011] Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance 249 
substitute (such as a trust or a life insurance policy), or under 
intestacy—lays out justification for the bar in the context of 
inheritance law, and offers a detailed plan for implementation.  In the 
context of wills and nonprobate transfers, I use an existing basis for 
invalidating a will, namely, duress: I argue that spousal abuse 
constitutes duress under existing doctrine and that sufficient evidence 
of abuse should create a rebuttable presumption that the will is 
invalid.  With respect to intestacy, I make the same argument that 
evidence of abuse should raise a rebuttable presumption that the 
accused is barred from inheriting. 
Part I of this Article defines terms, namely, “coercive control,” the 
phrase that describes the particular type of abuse that I address here, 
and “succession law,” the term I use to describe the area of law that 
my proposal covers—that is, both the law of intestate succession and 
inheritance under wills.  Part II explains that the bar is necessary 
because of its systemic impact and expressionary value.  Part III 
outlines the several rationales for the bar in the context of succession 
law.  This Part will also show that it is consistent both with the 
rationales underlying traditional slayer statutes in force in all 
jurisdictions, as well as with more recent statutes that bar inheritance 
for abusive behavior that does not result in the decedent’s death.  Part 
IV takes on the issue of intent, explaining why the bar legitimately 
overrides the decedent victim’s expression of intent in testamentary 
instruments, and why doing so does not stereotype or disempower 
women.  Part V outlines several aspects of implementation of the bar, 
such as evidentiary matters and standing, and offers a draft statute. 
The bar to succession and inheritance are necessary for two 
reasons: they are systemic interventions that address the broader 
social and political inequalities that both allow coercive control to 
take place and which coercive control itself exacerbates.5  Because 
women remain disadvantaged in the “public sphere,” they are 
susceptible to dependence and violence in the private sphere.  
Conversely, women who are victimized in the “private sphere” are re-
victimized in the “public sphere” by loss of employment, an 
inadequate criminal justice system response, and lack of resources.6  
One important aspect of this disadvantaging of women in society at 
large is the disparity in access to resources between men and women, 
 
5 STARK, supra note 4, at 172–74 (describing domestic violence as an integral part of a 
system of patriarchy that operates in both the private and public spheres). 
6 Id. at 363. 
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a disparity that contributes to women’s susceptibility to spousal 
abuse.7  The bar I propose intervenes to some extent in the process of 
the disparate accumulation of resources—wealth—in male hands. 
Second, the bar is an important use of the law’s expressive 
function, through which it enunciates what a society values.8  As 
things stand, that message is negative: while many laws bar 
inheritance on the part of people convicted of child and elder abuse, 
no such laws address inheritance on the part of those who commit 
spousal abuse.9  The existing regime of behavior-based inheritance 
law,10 then, sends the affirmative message that society cares about 
wealth transfer in cases of abused children and elders but not victims 
of spousal abuse.  This message is harmful to women, fails to express 
society’s values, and must change. 
A note on gender.  An assumption underlying my analysis is that 
the overwhelming majority of victims of coercive control are women.  
While men and women in intimate relationships assault each other at 
similar rates,11 experts disagree about whether men are ever victims 
of the coercive control cycle that concerns me here;12 it seems 
clear that because abuse among same-sex partners occurs at the same 
rates as it does among heterosexual couples,13 that men are 
 
7 See Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 367, 368 (2003) (noting that, for example, women recipients of Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families are “victims of domestic violence at rates . . . ten times 
higher than women in” the general population and observing generally that poverty makes 
women more susceptible to intimate partner violence). 
8 For a discussion of the law’s expressive function, see E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive 
Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1063, 1099–2001 (1999) (arguing for the law's expressive function in the context of 
legitimizing domestic partnerships); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN 
WESTERN LAW 9 (1987) (arguing that the content and very existence of laws “influence 
the manner in which we perceive reality”). 
9 See infra notes 104–10, 123–32 and accompanying text. 
10 For a discussion of behavior-based inheritance law, see generally Frances H. Foster, 
The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199 (2001–2002) (discussing 
the family model for inheritance and its limits). 
11 STARK, supra note 4, at 91–92 (discussing studies that show equal rates of 
assaultive behavior among men and women). 
12 Although Evan Stark insists that men are never victims of coercive control, STARK, 
supra note 4, at 91–92, Kelly Stoner, Director of the Native American Legal Resource 
Center and domestic violence expert at Oklahoma City University School of Law, has 
handled cases of coercive control with male victims.  See E-mail from Kelly Stoner to 
Carla Spivack, author (on file with author). 
13 Same Gender Violence Statistics, U. OF WISCONSIN-STOUT, http://www 
.uwstout.edu/cvpp/same_gender_stats.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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probably also victims.14  In this Article, I refer to victims of coercive 
control as women, using “she” and “her” throughout, but in doing so I 
do not take a position on whether men can also be victims or what 
their rate of victimization might be.  I do, however, think it is clear 
that the majority of those targeted by coercive control tactics in 
intimate relationships are women, and that, as a social and political 
phenomenon, coercive control is connected to gender inequality.  If 
men are also victims, it reflects the fact that gender roles and power 
differentials appear in an endless variety of permutations in individual 
relationships;15 it does not undermine the notion that there is a link 
between intimate violence and broader social inequality between the 
sexes.  In any case, the legislation I propose is gender neutral. 
The bar I propose is limited to the specific set of behaviors 
collectively labeled “coercive control.”  Coercive control refers to a 
pattern of “repeated battery and injury, psychological abuse, sexual 
assault, progressive social isolation, deprivation, and intimidation” by 
the intimate partner,16 and is akin to the kinds of brainwashing 
techniques used on prisoners of war, political prisoners, hostages, 
and kidnap victims.17  This is a phenomenon that goes far beyond 
occasional, or even frequent, situation-specific physical assaults; 
rather, it is a strategic use of threats and force to “deter or trigger 
specific behaviors, win arguments, or demonstrate dominance”;18 
 
14 Whether men are victims of domestic violence, and what definition of domestic 
violence should apply to ascertain the answer to the question, are both highly fraught 
issues.  See, e.g., Alexander Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards 
Men: Overcoming Societal Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting 
Responsible Legislation, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 249, 251 (2002–2003) (discussing 
the cultural stereotypes that make domestic violence against men less visible than violence 
against women).  But see Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten 
Out” Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet 
Criminal Law’s Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 115 (2003) (observing “that females are generally victims of the 
entire cycle/structure of abuse, [e.g., coercive control] not just of the physical violence 
which constitutes domestic abuse as the law defines it”). 
15 The fact that men are also victims of domestic violence does not undermine the claim 
that domestic violence is linked to gender inequality: I agree with Adele Morrison’s 
assertion that spousal violence is not “male” in the sense of endemic to the male sex, but 
rather, “an aspect of the ‘socially constructed’ . . . man’s behavior, which can be 
committed regardless of the biological sex, sexual orientation or sexual community of the 
offender.”  Morrison, supra note 14, at 92 (internal footnote omitted). 
16 STARK, supra note 4, at 12; American Medical Association Diagnostic and Treatment 
Guidelines on Family Violence, 1 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED. 39–47 (1992). 
17 STARK, supra note 4, at 12. 
18 Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: 
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 743 (2005). 
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and serves to “control [the] victim through a variety of tactics 
[which] may include fear and intimidation, physical and/or sexual 
abuse, psychological and emotional abuse, destruction of property 
and pets, isolation and imprisonment, economic abuse, and rigid 
expectation of sex roles.”19  This Article proposes that evidence that a 
spouse engaged in a pattern of coercive control would raise a 
rebuttable presumption that any transfer by a will or will substitute 
merits invalidation on the ground that it was the product of duress.  
As I will show, coercive control fits the existing paradigm of duress 
well.  Further, I propose that such evidence also serves to raise a 
presumption barring succession under intestacy in cases where the 
decedent left property not disposed of under a will or nonprobate 
transfer.  In both cases, if the presumption prevails, the surviving 
spouse would be treated as if he or she had predeceased the decedent. 
I limit the proposed bar to the coercive control phenomenon for 
two reasons: to limit the possibility of false positives, and to alleviate 
evidentiary problems.  Confining the bar to cases of coercive control 
reduces the chance of false positives because the targeted behavior 
encompasses a highly specific cluster of actions that are 
distinguishable through specific indicia from other forms of violence 
and dysfunction between intimate partners such as situation-specific 
assault or verbal abuse.  First, and most importantly, the term 
“coercive control” consists of a pattern of behavior over time.20  
Isolated incidents, without more, do not necessarily support a finding 
of coercive control.21  Second, coercive control is marked by an 
idiosyncratic and extreme set of behaviors all motivated by the desire 
to control the victim’s daily life.  These behaviors are not all unique 
to coercive control situations but, when found together, strongly 
suggest its presence: destruction of personal belongings, threats of 
harm or suicide, threats toward pets or children, and minute 
surveillance of daily life like requiring a spouse to keep a log of her 
 
19 Judy L. Postmus, Analysis of the Family Violence Option: A Strengths Perspective, 
15 AFFILIA 244, 245 (2000) (citations omitted); see also Dutton & Goodman, supra note 
18, at 754 (explaining the need to understand spousal abuse as coercion and not as isolated 
“assaultive acts”). 
20 MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A COERCIVE CONTROL MEASURE FOR INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/214438.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
21 Russell P. Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence, 39 SOC. 
PROBS. 71, 83 (1992). 
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locations and activities throughout the day.22  A finding of coercive 
control does not require that all of these behaviors be present, but 
several of them continuing over time strongly support such a finding. 
This limitation to specific elements also reduces the role that 
cultural bias might play in raising a presumption.  For example, a 
couple may follow a religion that restricts the woman’s autonomy, 
denies her decision-making power in the household, and mandates 
obedience to the husband.  Such a code of conduct is mutually agreed 
upon, however, and lacks indicia like physical threats, a pattern of 
violence, public humiliation, destruction of belongings, threats and 
abuse directed toward pets or children, or obsessive surveillance, that 
would support a finding of coercive control.  For example, in the case 
of Muhammad v. Muhammad, a wife sought a divorce based on 
cruelty because she and her husband lived in a strict religious 
community in which women were not allowed to make important 
decisions about childrearing and household affairs, were deprived of 
money, and were encouraged to stay in the home.23  The initial 
decision to join the community had been mutual; but the wife had 
grown dissatisfied with this lifestyle, and the husband refused to 
leave.24  The court found a basis for the cruelty claim,25 but 
Muhammad is clearly distinguishable from the coercive control 
scenario: despite the institutionalized subordination of the wife in the 
marriage, there was no pattern of threats against the wife or children, 
no surveillance, no stalking or destruction of possessions.  This case 
illustrates how the coercive control net is fine-meshed enough to let 
cultural or religious observance, without more, evade the definition. 
Several rationales justify the bar, both as a presumption of duress 
and as a bar under intestacy.  First, as a public policy matter, the bar 
would allow the law to make a powerful statement against spousal 
abuse: little is more powerful than taking away an abuser’s 
expectation of property.  Second, many of the traditional rationales 
for so-called slayer statutes—which prevent a murderer from 
inheriting from his victim26—also apply, as I will show, to cases of 
 
22 LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 87 (1986) (describing 
techniques employed by abusers). 
23 Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 1993). 
24 Id. at 1241. 
25 Id. at 1250. 
26 For discussion of the slayer rule and its rationale, see Karen J. Sneddon, Should 
Cain's Children Inherit Abel's Property?: Wading into the Extended Slayer Rule 
Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 102 (2007) (noting that the rule is grounded in the 
maxim that “no [one] can take advantage of his or her own wrong” but also in other 
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spousal abuse that fall short of killing.  Third, such a bar would use 
harmful behavior toward the decedent as a potential bar to 
inheritance.  This behavior-based approach represents a growing 
trend, which the inheritance bars against those who committed child 
or elder abuse represent.27  Moreover, abuse breaches the marriage 
contract; thus, as a moral matter, denying the abuser the fruits of that 
contract in the form of spousal inheritance is just.28 
Finally, my approach is systemic.  Interventions against domestic 
violence over the past twenty years have failed to take on the 
structural inequality that both enables and is enabled by it: women’s 
inequality in the workforce, in political life, and in wealth acquisition 
all make them susceptible to intimate abuse, and intimate abuse, in 
turn, perpetuates those inequalities by depriving women of full access 
to those forms of equality.29  Eradication of partner abuse must 
address this nexus between abuse and other forms of inequality.  One 
area in which to do this is inheritance law.  Barring inheritance by 
abusers acknowledges and addresses the nexus between intimate 
 
principles, such as “the moral principle [that] human life is sacred; the equitable principle   
. . . preventing unjust enrichment; and the legal principle [that] a third party (in this case, 
the slayer) should not interfere with the transfer of another’s property (here, the victim’s)” 
(first alteration in original) (internal footnotes omitted)); see also Mary Louise Fellows, 
The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489, 490 (1986) (arguing 
“that the slayer rule is an essential element of the property transfer law system and does 
not rest solely on equity principles”). 
27 For discussion of behavior-based inheritance regimes, see generally Foster, supra 
note 10 (discussing the family model of inheritance and its limits); Frances H. Foster, 
Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998) (discussing the Chinese system and its consideration of good and 
bad behavior toward the decedent); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing 
Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2000) (addressing family principles and intestacy law); 
Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked? 49 
MIAMI L. REV. 257 (1994) (applying behavior-based models to child support issues); 
Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We 
Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517 (1994) (linking parental behavior with intestacy rights).  
Others express concern about this trend.  See generally Richard Lewis Brown, 
Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547 
(2006) (addressing problems with the termination of parental rights statutes); Adam J. 
Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 (2004) (expressing concern that such systems are too subjective 
and value laden); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CINN. 
L. REV. 803 (1993) (questioning slayer statutes). 
28 For discussions of the idea of marriage as contract, see generally TAMARA METZ, 
UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR DIVORCE 47–83 
(2010); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 122–23 (1989). 
29 STARK, supra note 4, at 362–63 (noting that the movement against domestic abuse 
has failed because it has “failed to address the inequalities at its core”). 
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violence and women’s wealth inequality: coercive control often 
includes financial control and prevents women from acquiring and 
keeping wealth and, often, from getting or keeping jobs or 
maintaining careers.  The resources that a victim spouse might 
transfer to the perpetrator through inheritance would likely both 
reflect this aspect of coercive control and contribute to the overall 
skew in wealth between men and women in society at large.  In this 
sense, it’s possible to see such transfers as the irrepressible ghost of 
coverture, perpetuating, and enabled by, gender inequality in 
marriage. 
Few people have paid attention to the intersection between 
domestic abuse and succession law.30  Two exceptions to this 
inattention are Robin Preble’s 1995 article arguing that spousal abuse 
should bar intestate succession under Minnesota intestacy statutes and 
the Uniform Probate Code,31 and Thomas H. Shepherd’s 2001 
Comment, which builds on Preble’s suggestion by proposing a statute 
and an evidentiary standard for use in implementing the bar.32  In 
addition, a recent article includes, without great detail, spousal abuse 
as one of several forms of “marital fault” that should bar 
inheritance.33  Although admirable, these suggestions do not go far 
enough: I argue here that evidence of the pattern of coercive control 
should raise a presumption that the surviving spouse is barred from 
inheriting both under wills and under intestacy, and I also expand the 
scope of evidence admissible to establish the behavior, address 
concerns about the stereotyping and disempowerment of battered 
women, and offer a detailed plan for implementation. 
I 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The behavior I seek to address here is the all-encompassing cycle 
in intimate relationships called coercive control, not that of occasional 
 
30 For this term, see infra Part I.  It is interesting that the three articles on this topic in 
the literature are by students and one recent graduate, not members of the legal academy.  
See infra notes 31–33. 
31 Robin L. Preble, Comment, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for 
Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 402 (1995). 
32 Thomas H. Shepherd, Comment, It's the 21st Century . . . Time for Probate Codes to 
Address Family Violence: A Proposal that Deals with the Realities of the Problem, 20 ST. 
LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 449, 464–66 (2001). 
33 Allison Bridges, Comment, Marital Fault as a Basis for Terminating Inheritance 
Rights: Protecting the Institution of Marriage and Those Who Abide by Their Vows—‘Til 
Death Do Them Part, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J. 559 (2010). 
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or even frequent violence in a relationship that lacks the other features 
of the control cycle.34  A number of scholars have redrawn the 
contours of the phenomenon over the past twenty years to reconfigure 
it to the coercive control paradigm.  Evan Stark, for example, 
domestic violence expert and Professor and Chair of Urban Health 
Administration at Rutgers University, rejects what he calls the 
“violence approach” in favor of the coercive control paradigm.35  
Stark explains that “coercive control” consists of the combination of 
“repeated battery and injury, psychological abuse, sexual assault, 
progressive social isolation, deprivation, and intimidation” by the 
intimate partner, and is akin to the kinds of brainwashing techniques 
used on prisoners of war, political prisoners, hostages, and kidnap 
victims.36  Other scholars in the field have made the analogy to prison 
camp inmates and have observed ten similar phenomena among 
coercive control victims and inmates of German concentration camps, 
as recorded by Bruno Bettelheim: 
1) guilt . . . 2) significant loss of self esteem; 3) detachment of 
emotion from incidents of severe violence . . . 4) failure to observe 
the controller’s rules because of arbitrariness of punishment; 5) 
extreme emotional reactions; 6) difficulty planning for the future     
. . . 7) fear of escaping the coercive control situation; 8) child-like 
dependency on the controllers, and identification with them; 9) 
imitation of controllers’ aggressiveness, and adoption of their 
values; 10) maintenance of the hope that the controller is kind and 
just.37 
In a similar vein, another scholar notes that “[t]he reaction to such 
traumatic or catastrophic events experienced by many targeted 
women is more than fear for their immediate safety or the safety of 
 
34 The "Power and Control Wheel," describing the elements and cycle of domestic 
abuse, is widely available on the Internet.  See, e.g., Power and Control Wheel, NAT’L 
CENTER ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, http://www.ncdsv.org 
/images/PowerControlwheelNOSHADING.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).  One segment 
of the wheel is headed “Economic Abuse” and lists the following forms of financial 
control exercised over the victim spouse: “Preventing her from getting or keeping a job.  
Making her ask for money.  Giving her an allowance.  Taking her money.  Not letting her 
know about or have access to family income.”  Id.  For further discussion of the financial 
abuse aspect of domestic violence, see STARK, supra note 4, at 130–31, 272 (giving 
examples of ways male abusers exploit women financially). 
35 STARK, supra note 4, at 12. 
36 Id. 
37 OKUN, supra note 22. 
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their children; they may be immobilized; the trauma of the violence 
governs, guides, or influences their actions and decisions.”38 
Of particular relevance here is the financial aspect of this control: 
one of the ways abusers exercise control is by confiscating the 
victim’s wages and property, denying her access to resources even 
when they are hers, and forcing her to sign her property over to 
them.39  This context supports the presumption that the victim of 
coercive control did not make testamentary dispositions “voluntarily,” 
that is, as she would have done without the control.  It also supports 
the proposition that the victim’s estate should not pass to an abusive 
surviving spouse under intestacy; because about half the population 
dies without wills, the amount covered by intestacy is significant. 
As a final definitional matter, I use the term “succession law”40 to 
refer to inheritance through bequests in wills and through nonprobate 
transfers as well as succession to property under intestacy statutes.  
As noted above, the proposal to bar succession under intestacy for 
perpetrators of spousal abuse has already been made, and I fully 
support it.  This Article advocates expanding such a bar to include 
wills, and thus dwells on that area of the law, but I use the term to 
indicate that any such a bar should include intestate succession as 
well. 
II 
WHY THE BAR IS NECESSARY 
A.  The Systemic Impact 
Coercive control in the home is located “within a larger (and 
potentially criminal) pattern of male domination”41 in society at large, 
a component of which is women’s deprivation of property and lack of 
equal access to financial wealth.  If we reconfigure domestic violence 
as the private replication of social patterns of male domination, we 
can see how it contributes to an overall pattern of women’s economic 
disadvantage.42  In this context, testamentary transfers from victims 
 
38 Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in THE 
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 11, 33 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
39 See examples infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
40 For which I thank Frederic S. Schwartz. 
41 Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to 
Coercive Control, 58 ALB.  L.  REV. 973, 981 (1995). 
42 STARK, supra note 4, at 363. 
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of coercive control to their abusers contribute to this overall social 
phenomenon and should be seen as causing, in part, the social harms 
that result from it.  In this light, a law such as the one I propose is an 
antidiscrimination law akin to the Equal Pay Act.  Such laws would 
seek to right discriminatory patterns that disadvantage women. 
Such a view—that transfers from abused spouses to their abusers is 
enabled by and reinforces the systemic oppression of women—does 
not require that abusers engage in a vast social conspiracy to 
disempower women.  Certainly, employers whose workplace policies 
create so-called “glass ceilings,” making it difficult for women to 
reach the highest levels in the organization, deny women 
compensated time off for childbirth and childcare, and lack on-site 
daycare; governments that decline to mandate paid parental leave, and 
advertisers who objectify women’s bodies to sell products are all 
motivated by various forces, often economic ones, and do not operate 
out of the psychological needs that drive the abuser who exercises 
coercive control.  Conversely, economic gain is not what moves 
abusers to seek control of spousal property; economic gain is a by-
product of the abuser’s quest for control.43  These differing 
motivations, however, do not make the forced transfer of spousal 
property any less embedded in the systemic inequality of women.  For 
example, women, especially women with children, are often 
financially dependent on men because of their inequality in the 
workplace, thus making it harder for them to leave abusive 
relationships and further empowering the abuser.  The inequality of 
women results from a range of exercises of power from different sites 
in society; such power is diffuse and appears detached from any 
particular individual,44 yet its cumulative effect is undiminished 
thereby. 
Inheritance is part of this diffuse system.  Inheritance is the 
“genetic code of a society,” guaranteeing that each “generation will, 
more or less, have the same structure as the one that preceded it.”45  
This result is often unrelated to the motivations of the individual 
testator or decedent, who may have any of a wide range of reasons for 
making whatever dispositions he or she makes.  Nonetheless, the 
 
43 Id. at 205 (noting that economic abuse is part of a strategy of maintaining control, not 
an end in itself). 
44 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 220 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1979). 
45 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, 
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). 
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transfers that are the subject of this Article likely arise both from the 
individual’s desire to control the donor and the systemic inequality 
that enables that control.  Thus, testamentary and nontestamentary 
transfers are a particularly suitable locus for the intervention I 
propose, perpetuating, as they do, this systemic oppression from one 
generation to the next. 
B.  The Law’s Expressive Function 
It is unlikely that either the presumption of duress or the 
presumptive bar on intestate succession will deter many abusers.  The 
need to control an intimate partner stems from psychological factors 
that are likely not susceptible to rational decisions based on long-term 
consequences,46 even if the perpetrator is aware of those 
consequences.  An important rationale other than deterrence, 
however, arises from what has variously been called law’s 
“expressive function”47 or its “constitutive function.”48  This is the 
idea that the law “teaches as it governs”; put another way, “The law 
has great potential to teach and reinforce the values that ground it or 
appear to ground it.  Those who experience the law operating upon 
them personally and those who observe the law operating on others . . 
. learn whom the law respects, ignores, privileges, and 
disadvantages.”49  Law never merely adjudicates or mandates certain 
actions as opposed to others; it also influences belief.50  A law that 
 
46 STEVEN M. MORGAN, CONJUGAL TERRORISM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
COMMUNITY TREATMENT MODEL OF WIFE ABUSE 19–22 (1982) (discussing 
psychological profile of abusers); see also Brown, supra note 27, at 567 (calling the idea 
that that the extinction of inheritance rights of abusive parents will deter child abuse 
“highly improbable”). 
47 See Spitko, supra note 8 (arguing for the law's expressive function in the context of 
legitimizing domestic partnerships). 
48 An extensive literature has arisen around this idea.  See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 
8, at 138–42; Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive 
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Richard H. 
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); see also Palma 
Joy Strand, Law as Story: A Civic Concept of Law (With Constitutional Illustrations), 18 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 603, 603 (2009) (developing the similar notion of “law[s] as a 
complex social system in which doctrinal law emerges from collaborative communicative 
interactions among the many members of society”). 
49 Spitko, supra note 8, at 1100 (internal footnotes omitted). 
50 METZ, supra note 28, at 92 (noting in the context of marriage “that laws shape 
identities to a significant degree" and influence the self-understanding of individuals 
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prevented abusers from inheriting property from their victims would 
be a clear condemnation of such behavior and would teach a lesson 
that the law “respects and privileges” a woman’s right to live free of 
the domestic terrorism that is coercive control.  Even codifying the 
notion that evidence of abuse raises a presumption of duress, using, as 
it does, an existing doctrine, constitutes a statement of this kind: it 
acknowledges the profoundly coercive nature of abuse and intervenes 
in the debate about battered women’s intent and responsibility. 
Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the notion that 
succession law has an expressive function, at least in the context of 
intestacy.51  Such skepticism seems reasonable in that context.  Adam 
Hirsch, for example, points out, fairly enough, that intestacy law is 
obscure to most people, few having the need to acquaint themselves 
with it, and few actually “witness [it] in action.”52  He adds, also 
fairly, that intestacy rules, as default rules, “do not represent strong 
statements about anything.”53  My response to these arguments is 
twofold: first, I am primarily concerned here with wills, because the 
argument about a spousal abuse bar in intestacy has already been 
made,54 and Hirsch’s arguments do not ring as true in that context.  
People do see the probate of wills in action, and a law invalidating a 
testamentary disposition is far more powerful than a default rule, 
which only operates when the decedent failed to make an affirmative 
decision.  I do, however, want to defend the intestacy bar as well.  As 
I have discussed, other reasons exist for a spousal abuse bar in 
succession law, which justify it under intestacy as well as under wills 
—namely, its nature as a systemic intervention into the transfer of 
resources in the context of spousal abuse and in the broader context of 
gender inequality. 
In this context, I want to address Hirsch’s main argument against 
empowering law to express social values, namely, that it opens the 
door to the politicization of inheritance law, potentially allowing 
legislators to infuse it with values inimical to my own or to the ones 
 
and of society at large).  Mary Ann Glendon is perhaps the best-known proponent of this 
idea about the law’s constitutive effect on marriage: she argues that the content and very 
existence of marriage laws influence the way citizens “perceive reality”).  GLENDON, 
supra note 8, at 9. 
51 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 27, at 1054 (“[T]he expressive ramifications of intestacy 
law appear alternately negligible and irrelevant, and . . . they should not influence the 
formulation of rules of intestacy or other inheritance defaults in (virtually) any respect.”). 
52 Id. at 1055. 
53 Id. 
54 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
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expressed here.  He argues, to the contrary, that the best course is for 
inheritance laws to decline the imposition of any set of values, 
focusing only on the effectuation of testamentary intent.  My response 
to this argument is that inheritance law—and all law—expresses 
values whether we want it to or not; value-neutrality is not an option.  
What look like value-free rules—in this context, “just” effectuating 
testamentary intent—do in fact express values, and only appear 
neutral based on one’s perspective.  Someone who came from a 
Western European country whose laws mandated the heirship of 
children, for example, might well see laws allowing for the 
disinheritance of children in the interest of effectuating the testator’s 
intent as expressing the value that supporting one’s family was less 
important than promoting dead hand control.  In fact, as I argue here, 
the lack of laws addressing transfers in the context of coercive control 
expresses values as dramatically as would the law I propose: as it 
stands, the law’s message to the abused spouse is that they were 
coerced into making transfers they would not otherwise have made—
a scenario remedied in every other context—is unworthy of the law’s 
consideration. 
III 
WILLS AND NONPROBATE TRANSFERS: COERCIVE CONTROL AND 
DURESS 
A.  Duress Is the Best Doctrine Under Existing Will Contest Law to 
Address the Coercive Control Scenario 
The existing grounds, other than execution formalities, on which an 
interested party may contest a will are as follows: capacity, fraud, 
undue influence, insane delusion, and duress.55  The elements of 
duress, as I will show, best embody the coercive control phenomenon.  
First I will review the other will contest doctrines and discuss their 
inadequacy, and then I will fit coercive control into the duress 
paradigm. 
The capacity threshold for executing a valid will is very low: 
indeed, the only legal institution with a lower capacity requirement is 
marriage.56  The testator must be eighteen or older, be 
capable of . . . understanding in a general way [(1)] the nature and 
extent of his or her property, [(2)] the natural objects of his or her 
 
55 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 159–221 (8th ed. 2009). 
56 Id. at 166. 
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bounty, [(3)] the disposition that he or she is making of that 
property, and [(4)] relating these elements to one another and 
forming an orderly desire [of] the disposition of the property.57 
The requirement of a general understanding of the nature of the 
property is a test of capability, not actual accurate knowledge: a 
testator, for example, who mistakenly but reasonably believed that her 
child is dead and makes testamentary dispositions accordingly would 
still be deemed to have sufficient capacity to execute a will.58  The 
capacity requirement, therefore, would likely be met in cases of 
coercive control.  Nothing about the phenomenon of spousal abuse 
undermines the victim’s capacity to understand the nature of her 
assets or the objects of her bounty.59 
Nor is the will of a victim of coercive control likely to be 
invalidated for fraud.  The elements of fraud in a will contest are: 
(1) a deliberate misrepresentation, (2) the intent to deceive, (3) the 
purpose of influencing the will, and (4) the result of making the 
testator make a disposition she would not have made had the 
misrepresentation not been made.60  Again, this doctrine is not likely 
to be applicable to cases of coercive control, where the abuser’s 
deception of the testator is not the issue.  Certainly, a common aspect 
of coercive control is that the abuser lies to the victim about his 
actions or whereabouts, but an inquiry about this fails to reach the 
main elements of the phenomenon, which are control and coercion.  
An abuser may not make any misrepresentations, but still exerts 
coercion to influence the will and force the testator to make a 
disposition she would not have made without the abuse.  However, 
without the deliberate misrepresentation with respect to the will’s 
dispositions, fraud is not applicable. 
The doctrine of undue influence might seem more suited to an 
inquiry that addresses the presence of this kind of control.  Undue 
influence occurs when “the wrongdoer exerted such influence over 
the donor that it overcame the donor’s free will and caused the donor 
to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have 
made.”61  Because such facts are difficult to prove directly, most 
 
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) 
(2003). 
58 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 159. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. at 207. 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(b) 
(2003). 
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jurisdictions allow the presumption of undue influence to arise when 
the contestant can show that there was a “confidential relationship”—
that is, a relationship of trust and dependence or interdependence—
between the parties accompanied by some other “suspicious 
circumstance” such as the wrongdoer’s procuring of the will, the 
donor’s weakened intellect, or the wrongdoer’s receipt of the bulk of 
the estate.62  Some jurisdictions allow the mere existence of a 
confidential relationship to raise the presumption.63 
The problem with this presumption is that a confidential 
relationship between spouses is presumed to exist and is seen as a 
natural and beneficial part of an intimate relationship.64  Further, most 
spouses leave the bulk of their estates to the other spouse, and both 
spouses are usually involved in the preparation of the estate plan.65  
Thus, for this doctrine to expand to fit the coercive control scenario, 
every marriage or marriage-like situation would raise the 
presumption.  This seems burdensome and impractical. 
Insane delusion offers no better alternative; in fact, it is probably 
least suited, of all the doctrines discussed, to will contests of the kind 
I propose.  A will, or part of a will, is invalid under this theory if the 
testator had an irrational belief, was unresponsive to evidence to the 
contrary, and this belief caused the testator to make a will or part of a 
will that the testator would have made differently without the belief.  
Although some victims of coercive control exhibit irrational beliefs—
that their abusive spouse has telepathic powers, for example, or 
cannot be physically harmed or killed—the scope of coercive control 
is far broader than these irrational beliefs and does not necessarily 
involve them.66  Insane delusion would be a clumsy tool with which 
to contest wills in coercive control cases because its elements fail to 
coincide with most of the indicia of the syndrome. 
Duress, however, is a will contest doctrine well tailored to the 
coercive control scenario.  Duress in the testamentary context occurs 
when “the wrongdoer threatened to perform or did perform a 
 
62 Id. § 18.3 cmt. h (2003) (providing a non-exhaustive list of possible suspicious 
circumstances). 
63 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 185. 
64 Jo Carrillo, The M Word: From Partial Coverture to Skills-Based Fiduciary Duties 
in Marriage, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 266 (2011). 
65 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 327. 
66 Lenore E.A. Walker, Understanding Battered Women Syndrome, TRIAL, Feb. 1995, 
at 30, 30 (reporting the case of a woman who shot her husband six times as he lay in bed 
then warned the police about entering the room where he was lying dead to “[b]e careful, 
he has a lot of guns in there.  He’s going to be very angry and will shoot you”). 
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wrongful act that coerced the donor into making a donative transfer 
that the donor would not otherwise have made.”67  A “wrongful act” 
is one which “is criminal or that the wrongdoer had no right to do.”68  
Unfortunately, the doctrine of duress has become entangled with that 
of undue influence69 in a way that is unhelpful for my purposes. 
Untangling the two, the New York County Surrogates Court in Estate 
of Rosasco denied summary judgment on the issue of whether a will 
was the product of duress.70  The court found that questions of fact 
existed as to whether the testator’s great nephew had exercised duress 
over his great aunt with respect to the dispositions in her will when 
“[h]e berated decedent and her sisters loudly and often,” struck and 
pushed his sister in the aunts’ presence, punched his sister in the 
stomach, and “tried to intimidate [the decedent and her sisters] 
physically.”71  The court found that the nephew’s violent “behavior 
had a keen effect on [the] decedent,” noting testimony that she had 
been afraid to change the executor of her will from the nephew to the 
niece because she was afraid he would find out about it and “hurt” the 
niece and “he’s just going to end up making things a lot worse and 
he’s going to hurt [the niece].”72 
The court concluded that the contestants had established a prima 
facie case for duress.73  It quoted the Restatement (Third) of Property, 
quoted above,74 and then turned to the Restatement (First) of 
Contracts to amplify the notion of duress in a way that makes clear its 
applicability to coercive control: the Restatement (First) of Contracts 
notes that “the doing of an act often involves, without more, a threat 
that the act will be repeated”75 and that past events often import a 
threat.76  The court also noted that “the standard for evaluating 
whether ‘an act or threat produces the required degree of fear is not 
objective,’” but, rather, a subjective one, asking “whether the threat 
 
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
8.3(c) (2003). 
68 Id. § 8.3 cmt. i. 
69 In re Estate of Rosasco, 31 Misc. 3d 1214 (2011), 2011 WL 1467632, at *11. 
70 Id. at *8–9. 
71 Id. at *2. 
72 Id. at *3. 
73 Id. at *8. 
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(c) 
(2003). 
75 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. d (1932). 
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DURESS & UNDUE INFLUENCE § 175 cmt. 
b (1981). 
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[or] act induced such fear in the testator ‘as to preclude the exercise    
. . . of free will and judgment.”77 
Itemizing the elements of contractual duress, Farnsworth explains, 
“First, there must be a threat.  Second, the threat must be improper.  
Third, the threat must induce the victim’s manifestation of assent.  
Fourth, it must be sufficiently grave to justify the victim’s assent.”78  
A threat must be the manifestation of the intent to inflict harm on 
another; importantly for coercive control purposes, one blow or act of 
harm can constitute duress because it implies, or can imply, the threat 
of further such acts.79  While one act alone is not often considered 
duress, one act, in a pattern of behavior, may indicate coercive 
control. 
Especially when drawn to include its application in the law of 
contracts, as the Rosasco court drew it, duress is a doctrine whose 
parameters fit well with the scenario of coercive control.  Other 
contracts cases bear out this intuition.  Courts have found premarital 
agreements to be unenforceable as the result of duress: in Holler v. 
Holler, a court found such an agreement to be procured by duress 
when, (1) the wife was a Ukrainian national whose American fiancé 
threatened not to marry her shortly before her visa was due to expire 
unless she signed the agreement, (2) the wife spoke very little English 
and could not translate the agreement or get it translated for her, and 
(3) the wife had no means to support herself or her child.80  These 
facts, the court went on, constituted the elements of duress, i.e., “(1) 
coercion; (2) putting a person in such fear that he is bereft of the 
quality of mind essential to the making of a contract; and (3) that the 
contract was . . . obtained as a result of this state of mind.”81 
In fact, many cases involving wives who claimed to have signed an 
agreement or property transfer under duress appear to be hidden 
spousal abuse cases, revealing a pattern of coerced property transfers 
to which the doctrine of duress was amenable.  In Trane Co. v. Bond, 
a wife claimed she had signed a payment bond as surety on a 
construction contract with her husband’s company under duress 
because her husband “physically threatened her and abused her to 
coerce her to sign a number of documents, including the payment 
 
77 Rosasco, 2011 WL 1467632, at *7. 
78 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.16 (3d ed. 1999). 
79 Id. 
80 Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
81 Id. at 475. 
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bond, and would not answer her regarding their content.”82  Relying 
on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and its “reasonable 
alternative test,” the court denied summary judgment and remanded to 
the district court for fact finding as to whether the wife was in 
“imminent fear of death, serious personal injury, or actual 
imprisonment.”83  In reviewing the relevant precedent, the court cited 
three earlier cases in which a wife had attempted to void a contract 
claiming she had signed it because of physical threats by her husband; 
in all three, the courts found duress.84  The duress doctrine also 
appears in cases challenging the validity of contracts between 
spouses.  In Eckstein v. Eckstein, the court found duress where a wife 
signed a separation agreement when she had left the marital residence 
with no clothes or money, and when the husband had withheld her 
belongings, closed their joint checking account and threatened never 
to let her see the children again.85 
In sum, duress—especially when expanded to include contractual 
duress—fits the coercive control scenario well.  The acts that led the 
Rosasco court to find a prima facie case of duress are typical of the 
kind of acts abusers perform: intimidation through acts of violence 
directed at family members, berating of the victim, and instilling the 
victim with fear of the consequences of noncompliance.  Importantly, 
the duress doctrine encompasses the notion that one act of violence 
implies the threat of another such act and that that atmosphere of 
implied threats can create duress.  The Restatement (Second)’s 
adoption of the “no reasonable alternative” test is also well tailored to 
explain the decisions an abuse victim might make in the context of the 
coercive relationship: it acknowledges the reality of coerced choice 
and limited options that constitute the environment of abuse. 
B.  Existing Statutory Regimes 
Existing statutory regimes fail to address spousal abuse, although 
they do offer precedent for the kind of regime I propose.  Four states 
have statutes that bar inheritance for some form of abuse of the 
 
82 Trane Co. v. Bond, 586 A.2d 734, 735 (Md. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
83 Id. at 740. 
84 Id. at 735–37 (citing Cent. Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305, 319 (1862); Whitridge v. 
Barry, 42 Md. 140, 153–54 (1875); First Nat’l Bank v. Eccleston, 48 Md. 145, 160 
(1878)). 
85 379 A.2d 757, 763–65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978). 
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decedent.86  These laws, however, as noted above, are tailored to 
apply to the elderly and the disabled, and, even when their language is 
fairly expansive, they are ill-suited to address the coercive control 
situation.  The California Probate Code, for example, gives as the 
heading for its section on abuse, “Effect of Homicide or Abuse of an 
Elder or Dependent Adult.”87  Even the more expansive of the two 
terms describing those covered by the section, “dependent adult,” 
would be stretched beyond its capacity to include coercive control 
victims.  Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
defines “dependent adult” as 
any person between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in this 
state and who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his 
or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her 
rights, including but not limited to, persons who have physical or 
developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities 
have diminished because of age.88 
This definition does not cover spouses or partners who find 
themselves in coercive control relationships.  Similarly, the relevant 
Illinois statute covers “financial exploitation, abuse, or neglect of an 
elderly person or a person with a disability.”89  Maryland’s law 
barring inheritance for abuse is titled, “Financial Crimes Against 
Vulnerable Adults”;90 a “vulnerable adult” is defined as “an adult 
who lacks the physical or mental capacity to provide for the adult’s 
daily needs.”91  Finally, Oregon’s relevant statute covers abuse of the 
elderly, disabled, or incapacitated.92  A victim of coercive control is 
not necessarily elderly or mentally or physically disabled, and thus 
likely does not fall under the purview of these statutes.  These 
statutes, however, offer templates and precedents for a specifically 
tailored regime that would address the particular challenges of the 
coercive control scenario. 
 
86 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (West 2010); 755 III. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
6.2(b) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(e) (West 2010); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455–112.465 (West 2010). 
87 CAL. PROB. CODE div. 2, pt. 7. 
88 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.23(a) (West 2010). 
89 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2. 
90 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(a)(10). 
91 Id. § 3-604. 
92 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455–112.465. 
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IV 
RATIONALES FOR THE BAR UNDER INTESTACY 
A.  Using Fault to Bar Inheritance Is Not New 
There is nothing new about applying a fault standard to bar spousal 
inheritance.93  Indeed, ancient Roman law barred certain parties from 
inheriting on the grounds of “indignitas,” that is, behavior toward the 
decedent that made the putative beneficiary unworthy to receive 
under the will.94  The most obvious: in all states, statutes or case law 
bar someone from inheriting, under wills or intestacy, from someone 
he or she has killed, treating the killer as if he or she had predeceased 
the victim.95  Many of the rationales for these so-called “slayer rules” 
also support a bar on inheritance by those who have abused a 
decedent spouse—that is, they support a bar on abusive behavior that 
does not result in death.96  Rationales for the slayer rules are multiple: 
the common-law maxim that no one can benefit from his (or her) own 
wrongdoing,97 the moral principle that human life is sacred and must 
 
93 See, e.g., Linda Kelly Hill, No-Fault Death: Wedding Inheritance Rights to Family 
Values, 94 KY. L.J. 319, 320 (2005) (“The states’ use of fault in probate runs the full gamut—
from denying all inheritance rights unless the surviving spouse is ‘totally free of fault' to 
awarding the decedent's estate regardless of fault simply because one ‘blunders into 
matrimony.’” (internal footnote omitted)). 
94 MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 437–39 (1927). 
95 Forty-eight states do so by statute; the rest still rely on case law. See, e.g., Bierbrauer 
v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935) (prohibition on inheritance 
extends to slayer's estate); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (slayer 
prohibited from inheriting).  New York’s slayer rule differs from that of most other 
jurisdictions by remaining a creature of common law rather than statutory law.  However, 
the principles underlying the common-law rule are essentially the same as those embodied 
in the statutory law of other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (2010); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803 (West 2010).  See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 
(amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 45 (2007).  The Supreme 
Court adopted this English common-law rule in New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886), and it was taken up by state courts beginning with 
Riggs. 
96 Here I part ways with Richard Lewis Brown’s thoughtful analysis, in which he 
concludes that many of the rationales behind the slayer rules do not apply to parents who 
abandon or abuse their children.  Brown, supra note 27, at 552.  From my analysis, it 
should be clear that I think these rationales could also apply to child abuse cases. 
97 The term “slayer” is used as the generic rather than “murderer” or “killer” because 
the statutes differ so widely in their specifics, like whether the rule is triggered by first 
degree murder or manslaughter, whether a legal conviction is required, etc.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. e 
(2003). 
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be protected, and the equitable aversion to unjust enrichment.98  
Another rationale is that the slayer rules also presume to honor the 
donor’s intent, by assuming that the donor would change the 
disposition benefiting the slayer if he were able.99  This rationale 
certainly applies in cases of wills, and may also arguably apply in 
cases of intestacy; because intestacy laws were designed, at least in 
part, to reflect a decedent’s likely intent.100  Finally, slayer rules also 
serve a retributive function, punishing the evildoer by denying him or 
her a benefit to which he or she might otherwise have been 
entitled.101 
These rationales can also apply, as I argue they do, in cases of 
abuse that do not result in the spouse’s death.  As for benefiting from 
a wrong, a spouse who exercised coercive control over his partner, as 
noted above, likely prevented her from leaving assets to a third party, 
or indeed from leaving the marriage, and should not benefit from this 
wrong by being allowed to retain the property.  A bar against 
inheritance by abusers also expresses the principle that life is sacred 
and that murder is not the only form of harm to human life that such a 
statute should address.  The kind of harm that abuse inflicts deprives 
the victim of a free human life and is thus an assault upon that human 
life.  The doctrine of unjust enrichment, which holds that a party 
relinquish a benefit when it would be inequitable for him to retain it, 
also fits the slayer rule paradigm: it would be inequitable for the 
abuser to retain the benefit from the victim.102 
 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(2) (Tentative 
Draft No. 5, 2007). 
99 Sneddon, supra note 26, at 103. 
100 Early in the twentieth century, Thomas Atkinson identified two bases for intestacy 
laws: provision for the decedent’s dependents and provision for those the average property 
owner would be most apt to favor.  Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals, 
20 IOWA L. REV. 185, 324 (1935).  More recently, scholars have added to decedent’s 
wishes the rationales of avoidance of title complications, promotion of the nuclear family, 
and encouragement of industry.  Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About 
Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 323–24. 
101 Some courts and scholars have questioned the retributive function of slayer rules 
insofar as they would also deprive heirs of the wrongdoer from inheriting from the 
estate, a criticism based on the constitutional prohibition against corruption of the blood.  
See generally Callie Kramer, Note, Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in the Uniform 
Probate Code Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 697, 698 (2003) (arguing that 
family members of slayers should not be barred from inheriting for the above-noted 
considerations and summarizing cases that have addressed the issue). 
102 FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, § 2.20.  Of course, the presumption that the 
disposition was the result of the abuse could be rebutted.  See infra Part VI. 
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The intent rationale also applies to coercive control cases.  The 
victim of coercive control, had she been able to make a disposition 
free of the control, would presumably have changed the disposition 
that benefitted the abuser.  All of the above rationales thus offer a 
bridge from slayer statutes—which bar inheritance to those who kill 
the decedent—to statutes that bar inheritance for those whose abuse 
of the decedent does not result in death. 
Increasingly, states already use fault that falls short of causing the 
death of a decedent to bar inheritance under wills or intestacy.  Such 
laws, for example, currently address child abuse or abandonment and 
elder abuse.  Many states’ Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) 
statutes also extinguish the parents’ right to inherit from the child.103  
The logic motivating these laws is the notion that a parent who 
neglected or abused the child severely enough to lose parental rights 
forfeits the right to inherit from the child—that is, he or she loses his 
or her right to benefit from the parent-child relationship.104  These 
statutes arguably make less sense than a statute barring the succession 
rights of an abusive spouse: it’s not at all clear that termination is 
always or even in the majority of cases based on factors that would 
justify the extinction of succession rights according to the above 
rationales, such as abuse and neglect.105  For example, courts have 
terminated parental rights on the basis of mental illness and mental 
retardation, which do not constitute parental fault or wrongdoing.106  
Termination of Parental Rights statutes also disproportionately impact 
minority families and mothers as opposed to fathers107 due to these 
 
103 For example, Virginia law provides: 
[A]n order terminating residual parental rights . . . shall terminate the rights of 
the parent to take from or through the child in question but the order shall not 
otherwise affect the rights of the child, the child's kindred, or the parent's kindred 
to take from or through the parent or the rights of the parent's kindred to take from 
or through the child. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(5) (West 2010). 
104 Monopoli, supra note 27, at 259 (explaining the justification for barring inheritance 
based on parental behavior). 
105 For analysis of the way social welfare agencies disproportionately target poor 
families and families of color, for example, see, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Protecting 
Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System 
[An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 587–89 (1997); Brown, supra note 27, at 551 (“The 
disinheritance provisions of termination statutes are poorly tailored for [the] purpose [of 
punishing “bad” parents], being both seriously over-inclusive and under-inclusive in 
their effect.”). 
106 Brown, supra note 27, at 570–73 (citing cases). 
107 Id. at 578 (“Parents charged with maltreatment of their children are disproportionately 
poor, disproportionately minorities (despite the fact that ‘there is no correction between race 
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groups’ higher rates of involvement with the welfare system,108 while 
authorities largely fail to investigate abuse and neglect in wealthy and 
upper class families, despite the fact that child abuse is as likely to 
occur in these social sectors.109  This disproportion suggests that 
some parental rights may be terminated due to cultural and economic 
factors rather than parental fault.  Again, courts have terminated 
parental rights of a mother in cases where the mother is a victim of 
domestic violence on the grounds that exposing the children to the 
abuse constituted neglect.110  Whether or not such action is necessary 
to protect children, it hardly seems to indicate a failure of parenting 
by mothers worthy of the punishment of disinheritance.  Yet, many 
states bar inheritance on these grounds. 
Other fault-based grounds for barring a parent’s succession from a 
child include abandonment, refusal to acknowledge the child, the 
commission of certain crimes against the child, and even, in a few 
states, some crimes against the other parent.111  Both the Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC) and the Restatement (Third) of Property allow 
for the disinheritance of undeserving parents.  The UPC bars 
succession unless a parent has acknowledged and supported the 
child;112 the Restatement bars succession by a parent who abandoned 
or refused to acknowledge the child.113  The rationale underlying 
these prohibitions is punishment of the abusive or neglectful parent 
 
and rates of child maltreatment’).” (quoting Appell, supra note 105, at 584 n.35) (internal 
footnotes omitted)). 
108 DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 32 
(2002) (“[T]he heightened monitoring of poor families [by welfare and other social 
service agencies] results in the discovery of a great deal of child maltreatment . . . that would 
have gone unnoticed had it occurred in the privacy afforded wealthier families.”). 
109 Catherine Albiston, The Social Meaning of the Norplant Condition: Constitutional 
Considerations of Race, Class, and Gender, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 29 (1994). 
110 Brown, supra note 27, at 572.  This phenomenon—battered women losing 
custody of their children due to their status as abuse victims—was the subject of a 
scathing opinion by U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein in the class action case 
brought against the City of New York and its Administration for Children Services, in 
which Judge Weinstein referred to the “widespread and unnecessary cruelty by 
agencies of the City of New York towards mothers abused by their consorts, through 
forced unnecessary separation of the mothers from their children on the excuse that this 
sundering is necessary to protect the children.”  Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 
2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
111 For a discussion of these statutes, see Rhodes, supra note 27. 
112 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (amended 2005). 
113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) 
(1998). 
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through denial of the benefit of the parent-child relationship.114  This 
logic would seem to apply with equal if not greater force to the case 
of the abusive spouse who stands to inherit his victim’s estate: neither 
abusive parent nor spouse should benefit from the relationship that 
gave rise to the benefit.  This is a moral argument not based on the 
proposition that the victim of abuse was coerced into leaving her 
estate to the abuser; it simply recognizes the injustice of a parent or 
spouse who violated the essential terms of the parental or spousal 
relationship benefitting from that relationship. 
My point is that fault-based bars to inheritance are already part of 
the legal landscape, and have been for some time, but often in forms 
that fail to meaningfully target those who are actually at fault in a way 
that justifies the inheritance bar.  Parental termination statutes, as 
explained, often target parents based on class and cultural differences 
rather than abusive behavior.  Compared to these regimes, my 
proposal is focused on actual perpetrators of harm—as opposed to 
those whose cultural or lifestyle differences trigger the bar but in 
reality do not perpetrate the harm the statute seeks to address.  A bar 
against succession by perpetrators of coercive control, on the other 
hand, addresses precisely the harmful behavior meant to be targeted: 
coercive control and its result in the transfer of resources. 
Fault between spouses can also serve as grounds for the extinction 
of succession rights.  For example, barring an adulterous spouse from 
inheriting is an ancient tradition, codified as far back as the Statute of 
Westminster II, which “barred a woman from dower if she had 
abandoned her husband [to] live[] in [adultery] with another” man.115  
Today, five states bar a spouse who has committed adultery from 
inheriting from the other spouse, though all five allow for the bar to 
be suspended if the couple had reconciled and resumed cohabitation 
(Kentucky and Missouri), if the aggrieved party was found to have 
condoned the adultery (North Carolina and Ohio), or if the adulterous 
relationship ended before the decedent’s death (Indiana).116  In a 
 
114 Rhodes, supra note 27, at 527. 
115 Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from 
Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 978 (2007). 
116 See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-14 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
392.090 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 31A-1(a)(2) (West 2010).  As Anne-Marie Rhodes has observed, these “soft 
bars” suggest that while adultery is still seen as a fault with the potential to bar 
inheritance, the discretion lies increasingly with the parties involved, suggesting that 
society’s presumed intent of the decedent has yielded to the adequately proven intent of 
the particular decedent.  Rhodes, supra note 115, at 979. 
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related vein, at least forty states address bigamy as a bar to 
inheritance, either by having adopted the UPC’s provision in this 
regard,117 or through case law. 
Both spousal118 and child119 abandonment bar inheritance in some 
states.  Most of the spousal abandonment statutes allow for 
suspension of the bar if the parties had reconciled and resumed their 
duties to each other before the decedent’s death; again, the social 
judgment is outweighed by the particular party’s intent.120  Eleven 
states bar inheritance from a child by a parent who abandons that 
child.121 
 
117 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-802(b)(2) (amended 2005) (stating in relevant part 
that “a surviving spouse does not include . . . an individual who, following an invalid 
decree or judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent, participates in a 
marriage ceremony with a third individual”).  Nine states have adopted this version of the 
UPC.  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.802(b)(2) (West 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2802(b)(2) (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-11-802(2)(b) 
(West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-802(b)(2) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., EST. 
& TRUSTS § 1-202(c) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-812(2)(b) (2009); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-802(B)(2) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-10-02(2)(b) 
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-802(2)(b) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
851.30(2)(b) (West 2011). 
 Six states have adopted an earlier version of the Uniform Probate Code, which omits the 
phrase "an invalid" in the code section, but clarifies in the subsequent comment that the 
divorce or annulment secured by the decedent was invalid.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 
2-802 (amended 1975); see also ALA. CODE § 43-8-252(b)(2) (2010); CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 78(c) (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-802(b)(2) (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-802(b)(2) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2353 (2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 62-2-802(b)(2) (2010). 
 Two states have adopted a more modified version of the Uniform Probate Code 
language.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2801(2) (West 2010) (including 
amongst the preclusion provisions that the remarriage may follow “an invalid decree or 
judgment of divorce" or that the survivor “at the time of the decedent’s death, is living in a 
bigamous relationship with another individual”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-102(b)(2) 
(West 2010) (noting that the survivor’s remarriage can follow either a “valid or invalid” 
divorce decree). 
118 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-
1-2-15 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2801(2)(e) (West 2010); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a)(5) (McKinney 2010); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
2106(a)(1) (West 2010).  Other jurisdictions may also acknowledge spousal 
abandonment.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.§ 533-9 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS. 
ANN. ch. 191, § 15, ch. 209, § 36 (West 2010). 
119 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-439(a)(1) (West 2010); 755 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.5 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-112(a)(1) (West 
2010); S.C. CODE ANN § 62-2-114 (2010); VA. CODE. ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (West 2010).  
For an excellent analysis of the issues behind such statutes, see Brown, supra note 27, at 
549 (reviewing existing statutes); Monopoli, supra note 27, at 261. 
120 Rhodes, supra note 115, at 983. 
121 Rhodes, supra note 27, at 532–33.  For this purpose, I am not including 
jurisdictions that have enacted the Uniform Probate Code section 2-114-type statutes 
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Elder abuse is a bar to inheritance in four states,122 and has been 
urged for adoption in others.123  Oregon, for example, bars an abuser 
as well as a slayer of an “elderly, disabled or incapacitated” person 
from taking a share of that decedent’s estate, by will or trust as well 
as by intestate succession; it treats the abuser as if that person had 
predeceased the decedent.124  Indeed, Oregon’s law goes further: it 
also prevents a slayer or an abuser from inheriting from an heir of the 
decedent unless that heir so provides in a will or other instrument 
executed after the victim’s death.125  Oregon law defines “abuse” as 
either physical or financial, and physical abuse includes, among other 
things: “conduct against a vulnerable person that would constitute   . . 
. [a]ssault, . . . [m]enacing, . . . [r]ecklessly endangering another 
person, . . . [c]riminal mistreatment, . . . [r]ape, . . . [s]odomy, . . . 
[u]nlawful sexual penetration, . . . [s]exual abuse, . . . [s]trangulation, . 
. . [or] unreasonable physical constraint.”126  Financial abuse, under 
Oregon law, includes taking or appropriating “money or property of a 
vulnerable person without regard to whether the person taking or 
appropriating the money [or property] has a fiduciary relationship 
with the vulnerable person.”127  These statutes barring inheritance 
only apply, however, “if the decedent dies within five years after the 
abuser is convicted of a felony by reason of [the] conduct” at issue.128 
Illinois law provides: 
Persons convicted of financial exploitation, abuse, or 
neglect of an elderly person or a person with a disability shall not 
receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the 
death of that elderly person . . . .  [The abuser’s] interest 
shall pass as if the person convicted . . . died before the decedent 
. . . .129 
 
regarding paternity that could arguably be used to disinherit abandoning parents.  See, 
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114 
(West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 
(West 2010). 
122 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 3-111 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
112.455–465 (West 2010). 
123 Lisa C. Dumond, The Undeserving Heir: Domestic Elder Abuser’s Right to 
Inherit, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 214 (2010). 
124 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.465(1). 
125 Id. § 112.465(2). 
126 Id. § 124.105(1), (2). 
127 Id. § 124.110(1)(a). 
128 Id. § 112.457. 
129 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2(b) (West 2010). 
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An abuser is defined as a caregiver who knowingly engages in 
conduct that will cause injury to the elder, fails to perform actions that 
he or she knows will cause injury to the elder, or abandons or 
physically abuses the elder.130  The exception to this rule is when the 
abused person based on “clear and convincing evidence . . . knew of 
the conviction and subsequent to the conviction expressed or ratified 
his or her intent to transfer the property, benefit, or interest to the 
person convicted” anyway.131 
California law, to a limited extent, bars a person from receiving 
from a decedent’s estate, whether by will, trust, or intestacy, if there is 
clear and convincing evidence that that person is “liable for physical 
abuse, neglect, or fiduciary abuse of the decedent, who was an elder 
or dependent adult.”132  The abuser is barred, however, only from 
inheriting monies that were added to the decedent’s estate as the 
result of an action based on the abuse.133  California does not require 
a criminal conviction to bar inheritance under this section, but it does 
provide that a conviction for false imprisonment or crimes against an 
elder or dependent person will automatically bar that person from 
inheriting as well.134  Finally, Maryland’s bar prevents inheritance 
from a decedent’s estate only when the heir is convicted of financial 
crimes against the decedent who was a “vulnerable adult.” 
The law in these states makes a clear statement that elder abuse is 
morally wrong, socially unacceptable, and fraught with legal 
consequences, namely, depriving the abuser of the possibility of 
receiving any benefits from the abused elder.  Whether this works as a 
deterrent to elder abuse is not clear.  Some abuse may arise from the 
frustration of an overburdened caregiver: while this is not an excuse 
for the behavior, it suggests that some abuse at least may have 
emotional triggers and be less susceptible to rational deliberation.135  
This, in turn, suggests that the possibility of a future deprivation of an 
expectancy—even if the abuser is aware of such a possibility—may 
not be an effective deterrent.  In this, elder abuse cases may be like 
spousal abuse cases: both forms of abuse, whether they stem from 
external pressure or the emotional and psychological makeup of the 
 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (2010). 
133 Id. § 259(c). 
134 Id. § 259(b). 
135 Karl Pillemer & David Finkelhor, Causes of Elder Abuse: Caregiver Stress Versus 
Problem Relatives, 59:2 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 179, 180 (1989). 
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abuser, seem unlikely to be susceptible to the braking effect of 
rational thought and thus are unaffected by awareness of future 
consequences. 
Nonetheless, these laws make an important statement about 
society’s and the legal system’s willingness to tolerate elder and child 
abuse.  As things stand, the law more strongly condemns elder and 
child abuse than spousal abuse.  It deprives someone who abused or 
controlled an elder from benefiting from that elder’s estate, but does 
nothing to prevent someone who has abused a spouse from inheriting 
from that person.  Surely we as a society condemn domestic violence 
as much as we do elder abuse, but these legal regimes suggest that 
one is more serious, at least with respect to the probate system, than 
the other. 
One could argue that one reason for the discrepancy in the laws is 
the greater physical and mental frailty of the elderly and children, 
who seem much less able to help themselves and thus more 
vulnerable than adult victims of coercive control and more in need of 
the law’s protection.  And, indeed, many victims of coercive control 
do fight back and sometimes escape their abusers.  The mere fact that 
some victims of a crime society abhors fight back, however, does not 
exempt those victims from the law’s protection.  While the elderly 
and young children may be even more vulnerable to abuse and less 
able to fight back, victims of coercive control are a vulnerable 
population as well.  Indeed, resistance and escape carry high risks of 
death: spousal abuse victims are most likely to be killed when they try 
to leave the coercive control situation.136  Thus, these victims may in 
fact be as vulnerable as children and the elderly based on factors other 
than physical and mental fitness.  Nor does the fact that abuse victims 
may have more physical and mental resilience than children and the 
elderly make the law’s expressive function any less applicable to 
them.  What the law currently expresses is less concern with victims 
of coercive control than for other vulnerable groups.  This must 
change. 
B.  Marriage: Reciprocity, Duty, and Contract 
Domestic violence breaches the marriage contract and destroys the 
reciprocity that constitutes the marital relationship.137  The UPC 
embodies the reciprocity ideal in its parental inheritance bar, section 
 
136 STARK, supra note 4, at 115. 
137 See Bridges, supra note 33. 
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2-114, which prevents a parent from inheriting from a child if his or 
her parental rights were terminated, or if the child dies before the age 
of eighteen and there was clear and convincing evidence that parental 
rights could have been terminated under the law of the jurisdiction 
due to nonsupport, abuse, neglect, or abandonment.138  This section 
seems based on the idea of reciprocity in the parent-child 
relationship,139 and it makes sense to import the idea of reciprocity 
into the marital relationship for inheritance purposes.  Indeed, state 
statutes barring inheritance to spouses who abandon their marital 
partners already embody this notion. 
Another way of looking at this issue is through the idea of duty: 
UPC section 2-114 can be read as assuming a duty between parent 
and child, the breach of which causes a relinquishment of rights on 
the part of the breaching party—in the UPC’s case, the terminated 
parent.  Again, this is a notion that translates easily into the marital 
context.  The philosophy animating any kind of behavior-based model 
of inheritance is the idea that the law is a teacher, setting forth clear 
standards for behavior among family members, punishing dereliction 
of familial duties, and rewarding their fulfillment.140 
 
138 Uniform Probate Code section 2-114 reads as follows: 
(a) A parent is barred from inheriting from or through a child of the parent if: 
(1) the parent’s parental rights were terminated and the parent-child 
relationship was not judicially reestablished; or 
(2) the child died before reaching [18] and there is clear and convincing 
evidence that immediately before the child's death the parental rights of the 
child’s parent could have been terminated under other law of this state on 
the basis of non-support, abandonment, abuse or neglect, or other actions or 
inactions of the parent toward the child. 
(b) For the purpose of intestate succession from or through the deceased child, a 
parent who is barred from inheriting under this section is treated as if the parent 
predeceased the child. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 2008). 
139 Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 643, 652–53 (2002) (“Reciprocity as a goal of intestacy statutes also has 
merit. . . . [T]he rationale applies to any family members who have supported each other, 
both financially and emotionally.”).  On the other hand, the UPC indicates that these 
statutes are also based on the idea of a parent’s moral duty to support his or her child; UPC 
section 2-114(c) bars a parent from inheriting from a child unless the “parent has openly 
treated the child as his (or hers) and has not refused to support the child.” 
140 Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: California Breaks 
New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 
52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 574 (2001). 
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V 
THE ISSUE OF INTENT 
The problem with this proposal in the context of testamentary 
transfers is that if the decedent spouse chose to make a devise in her 
will benefitting the survivor, had capacity, and the will was duly 
executed, the devise reflects her clear testamentary intent and should 
therefore be honored. Testamentary intent is the foundation of Anglo-
American wills law:141 for example, the Unites States is one of the 
few countries in the Western world that allows a testator to 
intentionally disinherit his or her children.142  This bedrock notion of 
the power of intent, called “Control of the Dead Hand,” allows, in 
theory at least, for few policy-based exceptions.143  What, then, 
justifies codifying a shortcut, such as the one I propose, to arrive at 
duress based on the general nature of a relationship?  How can I argue 
for interfering with a disposition the victim spouse either made (if she 
left a will or executed a nonprobate transfer) or failed to divert away 
from the surviving spouse (if she died intestate)? 
Moreover, isn’t it patronizing for courts to deem such a transfer the 
product of duress when the spouse chose to make it at the time?  
Doesn’t it deny to battered women the integrity of the choices they 
make?  Despite the fact that I have already shown that duress is a 
long-accepted basis for invalidating a will, I want to address this 
question in the context of coercive control where questions of abused 
spouses’ agency are hotly contested. 
My response to this set of concerns is threefold.  First, courts’ and 
legislatures’ commitment to a testator’s intent is flexible at best: 
courts routinely invalidate devises that flout social norms and 
legislatures override testamentary intent when they deem policy 
objectives to outweigh it; the law contains several instances where 
intent is trumped by another, weightier policy goal, such as protection 
 
141 For discussion of the principle of testamentary intent, see Emily Sherwin, Clear and 
Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between 
Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453 (2002). 
142 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 520–39. 
143 The idea that a testator should be free to dispose of his or her estate as he or she 
wishes is the basis for spendthrift and other forms of trust that allow the beneficiaries to 
avoid creditors and other undesirable payees: the reasoning being that the grantor, in the 
case of a trust, may choose not to have his estate paid to the beneficiary's creditors if he or 
she does not wish to do so.  For criticism of dead hand control, see generally RAY  D. 
MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 
(2010). 
SPIVACK 10/28/2011  10:34 AM 
2011] Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar Inheritance 279 
for a surviving spouse or adherence to wills formalities.  Second, the 
notion of intent with respect to a victim of coercive control is 
problematic, as I will discuss.  Finally, the strong social policy against 
domestic violence should outweigh concerns about intent in this case, 
as it does in other cases.  With respect to intent, the real question then 
becomes, what policy concerns are important enough for us to 
override it?  Surely barring abusers from the unjust enrichment of 
inheriting from their victims is one of them. 
A.  Inheritance Law Historically Allows Other Considerations to 
Trump Intent 
Despite American reverence for the dead hand, some policy 
concerns overrule this fundamental principle, and inheritance law can 
override the testator’s clearly expressed intent.  All states but one, for 
example, have elective or spousal share statutes,144 which allow a 
surviving spouse to choose to take a statutorily determined share in 
addition to or instead of taking under the decedent’s will.145  Thus, 
even when a spouse makes deliberate efforts to disinherit his or her 
spouse, the law will thwart this intent for policy concerns deemed 
weightier than intent, such as supporting the survivor or recognizing 
the partnership theory of marriage by leaving the surviving spouse 
with a share of an estate he or she helped accumulate.146 
Indeed, some states and the UPC are willing to undo nonprobate 
transfers such as trusts to augment the probate estate and add to the 
surviving spouse’s share, thus purposefully thwarting the testator’s 
intent.147  This is most often the case when the decedent seems to 
have made the transfer in a deliberate attempt to deplete the estate.  In 
such cases, the evasion of the testator’s intent is not a mere byproduct 
of some other mandate such as enforcing formalities.  Rather, evasion 
of the testator’s intent is the very purpose of the doctrine.  The UPC’s 
definition of the “augmented estate”—that is, the estate for purposes 
 
144 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 476 n.2. 
145 For an overview of spousal shares, see generally id. at 469–519. 
146 Id. at 476–508.  For discussions of the history and rationale of the spousal share, see 
for example, Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into 
Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the 
Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487 (2000); Raymond C. 
O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 59 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 617 (2010); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code’s Elective Share: 
Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2003). 
147 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2005). 
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of determining the elective share—not only ignores the testator’s 
intent, it subverts it entirely.  For example, UPC section 2-203, which 
defines the augmented estate, includes in it “the decedent’s 
nonprobate transfers to others,” which section 2-205 defines as 
“[p]roperty owned or owned in substance by the decedent 
immediately before death that passed outside probate at the 
decedent’s death.”148  This would apply, for example, if H created an 
inter vivos revocable trust, income to H for life, remainder to X.  
When H dies, without having revoked the trust, survived by W, the 
value of the trust corpus will be included in the augmented estate.149 
Even life insurance with a beneficiary other than the surviving 
spouse may constitute part of the augmented estate.150  In other 
words, if a decedent spouse buys a life insurance policy with a 
beneficiary other than the surviving spouse, under the Uniform 
Probate Code, the value of the policy will be added to the value of the 
estate for purposes of calculating the elective share.  The comment to 
this section makes clear that this provision was added explicitly to 
thwart intent: “Although the augmented estate under the pre-1990 
Code did not include life insurance, annuities, etc., payable to other 
persons, the revisions do include their value; this move recognizes 
that such arrangements were, under the pre-1990 Code, used to 
deplete the estate and reduce the spouse’s elective-share 
entitlement.”151 
Delaware’s augmented estate statute achieves a similar result by 
including in the augmented estate all decedent’s property subject to 
the federal estate tax.152  In taking this approach, Delaware implicitly 
recognized, as does the UPC, that its goal is to thwart the testator’s 
intent.  Its model is another regime that is adversarial to decedents’ 
intent, probably because tax authorities have “long experience with 
decedents trying to avoid estate tax by lifetime transfers.”153 
Other policy reasons exist for ignoring testators’ intent, particularly 
when that intent involves a restraint on the ability of the surviving 
spouse to remarry or otherwise interfere with a family relationship.  
For example, in Estate of Robertson, the testator’s will contained a 
provision stating 
 
148 Id. § 2-205(1). 
149 Id. § 2-205(1) ex. 3. 
150 Id. § 2-205(1)(iv). 
151 Id. § 2-205 cmt. 
152 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 902 (West 2010). 
153 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 496. 
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I hereby give and devise my real estate . . . more commonly known 
as 320 Blair Pike, Peru, Indiana, IN TRUST to James Lewis Nye, 
as Trustee, for the following uses and purposes, to-wit: 
a) The Trustee shall allow my husband, Lynn D. Robertson, if he 
survives me, to continue to live at said real estate as if he had been 
devised a life estate in said real estate, or until he remarries or 
allows any female companion to live with him who is not a 
blood relative.154 
The court found that the condition that the widower not remarry 
was a restraint on marriage and as such invalid for violating public 
policy.155  Likewise, conditions requiring separation or divorce are 
likely invalid for similar reasons.  In Estate of Owen, the court 
invalidated a condition prohibiting a daughter from renting a certain 
property as long as she remained married to an identified individual 
because it encouraged divorce.156  The Restatement (Third) of 
Property invalidates trusts that are contrary to public policy, in 
particular those that constrain family, religion, and career choices.157 
Wills that clearly express a testator’s intent can also be denied 
probate in the interest of upholding the formalities requirements of 
will execution.158  For example, as recently as 1998, a West Virginia 
court denied probate to the will of an elderly man confined to a 
wheelchair because, when he took his will to his local bank to execute 
it, after he himself had signed it, a bank employee carried the will to 
be signed by two other bank employees at their work stations, and 
those employees testified that they did not actually see the testator 
physically “place his signature on the will.”159  Thus, the will failed 
the requirement that the testator sign in the presence of the witness.160  
My point here is not to defend this extreme and unnecessary 
 
154 859 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  The children, who were also the 
remaindermen of the trust, brought suit when the father remarried.  Id. at 773–74. 
155 Id. at 776. 
156 855 N.E.2d 603, 611–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 29(c), 
cmts. j, k, & l (2003). 
158 Despite the protests of commentators, the UPC’s Harmless Error and Substantial 
Compliance Rule, and the increasing flexibility of some courts, such cases are not ancient 
history.  See Burns v. Adamson, 854 S.W.2d 723, 724–25 (Ark. 1993) (denying probate of 
will signed by testator in her hospital room because it was not signed in the presence of two 
witnesses when one of the witnesses signed the will before the testator had put her signature 
on it, despite the fact that a second witness later that day witnessed testator’s signature and 
signed in her presence); Estate of Proley, 422 A.2d 136, 138–39 (Pa. 1980) (will invalid 
because testator signed in the wrong place). 
159 Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611–12 (W. Va. 1998). 
160 Id. at 613. 
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formalism; rather, it is simply to point out that our inheritance 
system’s commitment to the testator’s intent is far from absolute. 
Moreover, courts have a long tradition of denying probate to wills 
that violate social convention.  For example, Melanie Leslie has 
shown that wills benefitting nonrelatives are more likely to be found 
invalid by juries than wills that benefit family members when the will 
diverts the decedent’s estate away from apparently deserving family 
members to beneficiaries who are not blood relations.161  There has 
also been considerable discussion of instances in which wills leaving 
estates to same-sex partners are more likely to be found invalid that 
those reflecting heterosexual relationships.162  Such cases are not 
mere horror stories from the “bad old days.”  The doctrine of undue 
influence is still being used to invalidate bequests that fail to comport 
with a court’s notions of social propriety despite having all the indicia 
of voluntariness and genuine intent.163  One example of many comes 
to mind.  In Estate of Reid, a court found an elderly woman’s bequest 
to a younger man to have been the product of undue influence despite 
the fact that the testator had adopted the man and had testified while 
she was alive that she wanted to leave him her estate because he was 
such a good son to her, and that anyone who insinuated that she was 
being unduly influenced was guilty of telling a “goddamn lie.”164  
This is not the only example: in the will contest over the Johnson & 
Johnson company fortune, the proponents of the will were worried 
enough about a finding of undue influence that they settled the case, 
despite testimony from the Columbia College of Surgeons Chief of 
 
161 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 
(1996) (“Notwithstanding frequent declarations to the contrary, many courts are as 
committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing 
normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary intent.”); see also Ray D. 
Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576–77 (1997). 
162 See E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent 
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 
CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 275, 276 (1999) (noting that despite protestation to the 
contrary, "[i]n practice . . . the law disfavors testamentary dispositions that deviate 
from the norm; it prefers gifts to the testator’s legal spouse and close blood relations 
over gifts to other potential beneficiaries”). 
163 Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be 
Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 265–66 (2010) (arguing that the doctrine is still 
being used to subvert testamentary intent and that the new arena for this subversion is the 
case in which elderly female testators leave bequests to younger men). 
164 Estate of Reid, 825 So.2d 1 (Miss. 2002); see also Spivack, supra note 163. 
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Psychiatry that the testator had complete autonomy in his financial 
decisions.165 
My point is not that a testator’s intent is unimportant.  Rather, it is 
that the value we attach to the ideal of intent in this context is relative, 
and, for better or for worse, often yields to other considerations.  
While the above-noted examples—wills being denied probate for 
seemingly trivial technical reasons and for failure to comport with 
social norms—may seem, and indeed may be, unfortunate and in need 
of repudiation, most of us are content with the overriding of 
testamentary intent when it furthers policy goals of protecting 
surviving spouses, invalidating restrictions on certain fundamental 
rights like the right to marry, or preventing illegal courses of action. 
All this is to say that the law is willing to ignore a testator’s intent 
when overriding it fosters an important social goal.  Overriding a 
testator’s intent to disinherit a surviving spouse, whether in the 
interest of keeping him or her off the public dole or in the interest of 
upholding the theory of marriage as a partnership, seems 
distinguishable from overriding it in the interest of punishing the 
surviving spouse.  First of all, it is not clear that the intent of the 
decedent in cases of spousal abuse was at all malicious, as we assume 
the intent of the disinheriting spouse to have been: in the case of the 
latter, we ignore intent because we find that intent unworthy of 
validation.  In the case of the former, however, there is nothing in the 
intent to leave property to the surviving spouse that we as a society 
find blameworthy or socially harmful.  My point here is not to argue 
that these situations are analogous, but rather to set the stage by 
putting our claims about the importance of testamentary intent into 
context.  The truth is, that despite our claims to honor it, we are 
willing to let other considerations trump it.  Intent is an important 
value in our system of inheritance law, but it is not the only one, or 
always the highest one. 
The role of intent poses fewer problems in the context of intestacy 
than it does when there is a will.  First, dying without a will, as about 
half the population does, expresses very little in the way of 
affirmative intent.166  Rather than being aware of, or choosing, 
intestate distribution, most people simply never get around to making 
 
165 DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON & 
JOHNSON FORTUNE 575 (1993). 
166 Hirsch, supra note 27, at 1047 (enumerating factors other than affirmative intent that 
contribute to the failure to make wills). 
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estate plans for various reasons, including reluctance to face 
mortality, aversion to engaging a lawyer, and reluctance to spend 
money.167  Second, the drafters of intestacy statutes based the laws on 
educated (by polls and studies) estimates of how decedents would 
want their estates to be passed.168  Thus, intestacy regimes are already 
charged with speculating about the wishes of decedents; a law that 
provides for speculation that an abused decedent would not want her 
abuser to inherit fits in with the purposes and design of the overall 
regime. 
B.  Intent in the Context of Coercive Control 
Second, the very idea of intent is problematic in the context of 
coercive control, to the extent that a finding of coercive control 
justifies, without more, a finding of duress.  Recent studies of spousal 
abuse have shown that it is a behavioral cycle that goes far beyond 
acts of individual battery, resulting in what Lenore Walker famously 
identified as “Battered Woman Syndrome.”169  It is an all-
encompassing program in which every aspect of the victim’s daily 
existence is subjected to minute scrutiny and contro1.170  Indeed, 
recent work with abuse victims outside of the medical context 
suggests that physical assault may not be the prominent feature of 
such relationships.171  The prominent feature is the fact that the 
relationship is “embedded in a strategy of control that is reinforced at 
a number of points of structural inequalities” in the surrounding 
society.172  For my purposes, the two most important ways women 
 
167 Id. at 147–48 (enumerating psychological factors that impede the making of wills). 
168 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 75. 
169 For discussion of “Battered Woman Syndrome,” see generally LENORE E.A. 
WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY 70 (1994); Lenore E.A. Walker, 
Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
321 (1992). 
170 See generally STARK, supra note 4.  Stark’s book is credited with reframing the 
issue of domestic violence from one of physical abuse to one of control of the victim’s 
life and mind. 
171 Id. at 85–86, 110. 
172 Stark, supra note 41, at 984 n.52 (identifying this feature as the difference between 
intimate violence against men and intimate violence against women, and using this 
difference to explain “why we observe the psycho-social profile distinctive of battering 
among women who are assaulted by their partners, but not among men”); see also Judith 
Lewis, Setting the Wrong Right: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on Dominance 
and Control, 23 ME. B.J. 48, 48 (2008) (“[T]o the battered woman, domestic violence is 
not experienced as an isolated physical act but rather as a series of physical and 
psychological acts by the batterer in an attempt to dominate and control her.”). 
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experience coercive control are through disempowerment and an 
altered sense of identity.173  Stark likens the victim of this kind of 
control to a prisoner of war or prisoner in a concentration camp 
because psychologists have observed that perpetrators of coercive 
control employ the same techniques as guards in those situations.174  
Similarly, psychologist Stephen Morgan has labeled spousal abuse 
“conjugal terrorism,” noting what he calls the “remarkable” 
similarities between the behavior of the violent spouse and the 
political terrorist.175  Another analogy to the treatment of abuse 
victims is the treatment by which pimps “break down” women to 
condition them to prostitution.176  These forms of conditioning entail 
three stages: they break down the personality and self-concept of the 
victim with random abuse, threats, isolation from the outside world 
and outside information, then present the victim with a new and 
different view of reality, which then becomes “installed” in the 
victim’s mind.177  The victim responds to the “breaking down” 
process with loss of self-esteem, dependence on the abuser, 
identification with the abuser’s aggression, fear of escape, difficulty 
planning for the future, and detachment from the violent incidents.178  
In Next Time She’ll Be Dead, Ann Jones presents a chart correlating 
practices listed in Amnesty International’s “chart of coercion” and the 
practices of men who exercised coercive control over women.179 
These techniques, like the similar methods used on political 
prisoners and prisoners of war, have a brainwashing effect, imposing 
the abuser’s worldview and reality onto the victim.180  Emerge, the 
Boston counseling program for batterers, defines violence as “any act 
that causes the victim to do something she does not want to do, 
prevents her from doing something she wants to do, or causes her to 
 
173 STARK, supra note 4, at 100. 
174 These studies are cited in OKUN, supra note 22, at 258. 
175 MORGAN, supra note 46, at 30. 
176 ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 85 (1994) 
(“The batterer subjects his wife or girlfriend to a process of seduction and coercion 
(known as “romance”), while the pimp uses an identical process of recruitment and 
indoctrination (known in the trade as “seasoning”) to “turn out” a prostitute.”). 
177 STARK, supra note 4, at 200. 
178 Id. 
179 JONES, supra note 176, at 89-91 (observing that the control skills at issue in 
battering “resemble nothing so much as the tactics used by Nazi guards to control 
prisoners in the death camps, and by Chinese thought-reformers to brainwash American 
P.O.W.’s in Korea”). 
180 STARK, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
SPIVACK 10/28/2011  10:34 AM 
286 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 247 
be afraid.”181  In other words, coercive control “is a process of 
deliberate intimidation intended to coerce the victim to do the will of 
the victimizer.”182  Elaine Hilberman created a profile of battered 
women based on interviews with abuse victims: 
These women were a study in paralyzing terror; the stress . . . 
was unending and the threat of assault ever present. 
Agitation and anxiety bordering on panic were almost always 
present. . . .  The women remained vigilant, unable to relax or 
sleep. . . .  [T]he waking lives of these women were 
characterized by overwhelming passivity and inability to act.  
They were drained, fatigued and numb, without the energy to 
do more than minimal household chores and child care.     
.  .  .   They saw themselves as incompetent, unworthy, and 
unlovable and were ridden with guilt and shame.  They thought they 
deserved the abuse . .  and felt powerless to make changes.183 
Women who are victims of coercive control have committed 
crimes on the orders of their partners, from minor larceny from an 
employer to child abuse, forgery, and grand larceny.184  In one of the 
most infamous abuse cases in U.S. history, battered wife Hedda 
Nussbaum watched her adopted six-year-old daughter die of a brain 
hemorrhage, too afraid of her companion, Joel Steinberg, to call for 
help.185  As Ann Jones explains, 
Put brainwashing in the context of an intimate relationship where 
traumatic bonding is likely to occur, add physical violence, 
sexual coercion, sexual abuse, and drugs—and the subject’s world 
rapidly collapses inward.  She restricts her movements, censors her 
thoughts, silences her opinions to match the demands of her 
increasingly powerful controller.  Options disappear. Choice 
becomes dangerous.  She is captive.186 
Add to this the fact that financial control is an important aspect of 
the control exercised over victims in the coercive control cycle: 
women are forced to turn over their paychecks, ask for even small 
 
181 JONES, supra note 176, at 88. 
182 Id. 
183 Elaine Hilberman, Overview: The “Wife Beater's Wife” Reconsidered, 137 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1336, 1342 (1980). 
184 STARK, supra note 4, at 261, 325. 
185 For accounts of the Nussbaum case, see SAM EHRLICH, LISA, HEDDA, AND JOEL: 
THE STEINBERG MURDER CASE (1989); Pete Hamill, A Tale of Abuse, N.Y. POST, Dec. 
13, 1988, at 2. 
186 JONES, supra note 176, at 186.  None of this is to affirm the now discredited findings 
of Lenore Walker that abused women suffer from “learned helplessness.”  Researchers 
have come to recognize the many active strategies these women use to cope, resist, and 
escape their batterers. 
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amounts of money, live on an allowance, and deprive themselves or 
their children of the chance to save money.  Evan Stark reports cases 
he encountered in his work with domestic abuse victims in which a 
husband took his wife’s earnings to support a gambling habit, another 
set up an embezzlement scheme in which she ended up being charged, 
and another refused to leave the marital home until the wife paid off 
his car loan and gave him the car.187  In another instance, a physician 
husband demanded that his wife leave her job, sell the many 
properties that she owned, and invest the proceeds in his medical 
research.188  In another instance, when a wife refused her husband full 
access to her paycheck and savings account, he tore up their marriage 
license and beat her, fracturing several bones and putting her in the 
hospital.189  Stark notes, “Regardless of family income, the 
distribution of money within abusive relationships is sharply skewed 
in the man’s favor, a condition that puts millions of women in affluent 
homes at enormous disadvantage in divorce or custody disputes.”190 
This skewing of family wealth as a component of domestic 
violence suggests that the donative actions of a woman in an abusive 
relationship that is defined by coercive control are highly suspect.  
Are we comfortable speaking about the testamentary intent of a 
battering victim who would watch her child die without acting 
because she was afraid of the abuser?  I suggest we should not be. 
C.  Does this Proposal Disempower or Stereotype Women? 
A response to this proposal to invalidate the properly executed 
wills of women who are deemed retrospectively to have been victims 
of coercive control is that such a move retroactively denies these 
women agency, and that it also contributes to the stereotype of abuse 
victims as helpless and unable to make decisions in their best interest.  
In this respect, one might compare my proposal with the mandatory 
arrest and no-drop policies that require the arrest and prosecution of 
perpetrators regardless of the victim’s wishes and may even force an 
 
187 STARK, supra note 4, at 324–26.  Stark goes on to point out that the material gain is 
not the ultimate goal of the control: rather, it is an important component of the strategy of 
coercion.  Id. at 334.  Nonetheless, for my purposes, the main point remains: financial 
control plays a key role in domestic abuse scenarios, and thus any transfer of resources 
from the abused spouse to the abuser should be suspect. 
188 Id. at 233. 
189 Id. at 343. 
190 Id. at 272. 
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unwilling victim to participate in the legal process.191  Many 
feminists argue that these measures deny the woman the ability to 
make decisions about what is in her best interest and ignore the fact 
that battered women are in fact capable of taking measures which are 
effective in the context of the relationship at protecting themselves 
and their children.192  These writers urge that the state recognize that 
intuitions about what is best for these women must give way in the 
face of their experience of their own lives and their exercise of their 
own agency.193 
This concern is related to the broader issue of empowerment of 
victims of coercive control.  Since her pioneering work in establishing 
the existence of “Battered Woman Syndrome” in the 1970s, Lenore 
Walker has been criticized by many feminists for promulgating 
stereotypes of female victims as helpless, irrational, traumatized, and 
psychologically damaged.  Her critics have insisted on the importance 
of seeing these women as making rationale choices within the 
confines of their situation.  Critics have also called for empowerment 
of these women by allowing them to decide what course of action is 
best for them to take at any given time in response to the abuse.194  
Such critics might well argue that my proposal perpetuates these 
 
191 For a discussion of these and other developments in the prosecution of batterers, see 
generally Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE 
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE vii, x (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 
1992) (referring to “wholesale changes in state statutes dealing with domestic violence”); 
Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, Irreconcilable Differences, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
WIFE ASSAULT 96, 98 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993). 
192 See Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with 
the Reality of Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35 (2008) (citing studies showing 
that battered women make effective strategic use of civil protection orders even when 
dropping the petition by signaling to the abuser that they are prepared to make the abuse 
public and that such strategic use of civil protection orders results in a significant 
reduction of violence in the relationship). 
193 See Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying 
Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515, 
559–60 (noting that battered women may use the threat of prosecution “to send  . . . a 
message that she will not tolerate the abuse” or to obtain “child custody, parenting time, 
child support or other material resources”).  Another example is the intuition that women 
would be safer if they left their abusive partners, but the reality is that they are most at risk 
of assault and death at separation stage, so a woman’s decision to stay in an abusive 
relationship, while seeming to be reflect helplessness, may in fact be a strategically sound 
decision to protect her safety.  Id. at 529–33. 
194 Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but 
Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 216 (2008) (discussing the 
multiple goals a battered woman might have in the context of a relationship, and noting for 
example that “[w]hile [she] may not want to be hit, she may want and need the abusive 
partner to remain at home to assist with child care”). 
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victims’ disempowerment, reinforces stereotypes, and fails to respect 
their decision making. 
I make three responses to this challenge.  First, my proposal does 
not perpetuate stereotypes of women.  It is merely a response to a 
coercive situation in which more women than men find themselves, 
due to women’s social and political inequality—and, perhaps, 
women’s on average smaller physiques.  Second, my proposal does 
nothing to deny the fact that women do resist their abusers in many 
ways, and struggle—often successfully—to retain a sense of agency.  
But in the cases I address, the victim is dead; the record of her 
moments of resistance and her other moments of strategic compliance 
is complete.  We are left with property transfers that may represent 
judicious decisions at the time they were made about when to fight 
back and when to give in.  Victims may not see struggles over 
property as worth the payback: one woman who shot her husband 
after years of abuse described to Evan Stark how she retained the 
“core of her survivor self” in small acts of resistance like “forgetting” 
to go to the store or do errands, and being “unable” to lose weight.195  
My proposal does not partake of the condescension Walker’s critics 
have observed in her characterizations; rather, it allows for the 
possibility that these victims’ forms of resistance may simply not 
have included refusing property transfers. 
Such an understanding of the abused victim’s agency conforms 
well with will contest and contract theories of duress.  While one type 
of duress situation occurs when a physically or mentally stronger 
party literally “places another’s hand on the pen and guides the other 
party’s signature,”196 the much more common and typical duress 
situation is one in which the assent is indeed the product of the party’s 
volition but is given in the face of a threat.197  As many commentators 
have noted, this is not a situation in which the assenter acts without 
free will: in fact, “there may be no situation in which the assenter acts 
with any greater degree of free will.”198  The alternatives available 
are constrained by the person exercising the duress, but the choice 
between them is that of the assenter.  The assenter simply had no 
other alternative besides the choices presented by the other party; her 
decision was made in that context.  The evolution from the 
 
195 STARK, supra note 4, at 306–07. 
196 Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. 
VA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2005). 
197 Id. at 445. 
198 Id. 
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Restatement (First) of Contracts to the Restatement (Second) 
embodies this revision in the understanding of duress: the 
Restatement (First) defines duress as a situation which deprives the 
assenter of the ability to exercise free will;199 the Restatement 
(Second), instead, asks whether the assenter had any reasonable 
alternative to assent in the context of the threat.200  It asks the court to 
evaluate the alternatives available to the assenter and assess their 
viability at the time of contracting.201  This analysis fits the coercive 
control situation extremely well and allows for the abused spouse’s 
exercise of agency.  It recognizes that she makes strategic decisions 
based on a limited set of options, deciding how to best avoid the 
worse harm in a given set of circumstances.  This paradigm 
recognizes that property transfers in this context are simultaneously 
the product of the spouse’s exercise of agency and of duress. 
Finally, another corollary of the fact that the victims in this case are 
dead: a denial of probate on the grounds of coercive control does 
nothing to undermine a victim’s ability to make decisions; she is no 
longer an actor.  The only concern, therefore, is not with respect to the 
individual woman whose will is at issue, but rather the position this 
law might play in perpetuating the stereotype that the choices and 
decisions of female abuse victims are unworthy of respect and 
enforcement.  I would argue that, to the contrary, such a law would 
send a clear message that the economic fruits of coercive control will 
be denied to the abuser, and that the decedent’s right to her property 
will receive respect from the state in that it does not allow it to pass to 
the person who victimized her. 
VI 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  What Constitutes Evidence of Coercive Control? 
The proposed statute would specify the type of evidence that would 
raise a presumption of coercive control.  Such evidence would consist 
of findings about the alleged abuser’s behavior toward the 
 
199 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS: DURESS & UNDUE INFLUENCE § 492(b) 
(1932). 
200 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DURESS & UNDUE INFLUENCE § 175(1) 
(1981). 
201 Id. 
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decedent.202  These specific findings enumerate forms of behavior, 
and also offer a non-exhaustive list of examples of each one.  These 
areas include: 
• Intimidation, in the form of physical assault or the threat of 
physical assault, or threats of harm to self, children, pets, or 
others the decedent cared about, in order to force the victim to 
perform acts against her will.  Examples include, but are not 
limited to, causing fear in the victim by the use of looks, 
intimidation, actions and gestures; destroying the victim’s 
property; threatening suicide; abusing pets; and displaying 
weapons. 
• Emotional abuse.  Examples include, but are not limited to, 
insulting the victim, making the victim think she is crazy, 
humiliating the victim, or calling the victim names. 
• Isolation.  Examples include, but are not limited to, restricting the 
victim’s involvement with friends, family and coworkers; 
controlling the victim’s activities, such as where she goes, what 
she does, what she reads or watches on television; or controlling 
access to transportation. 
• Minimization and/or denial of abusive behavior.  Examples 
include, but are not limited to, making light of the abuse, 
blaming the victim for the abuse, or denying that the abuse took 
place. 
• Use of children to perpetrate the abuse.  Examples include, but 
are not limited to, threatening to harm the children or take them 
away, or using visitation to harass and intimidate the victim. 
• Use of male privilege.  Examples include, but are not limited to, 
treating the victim like a servant; refusing to allow the victim a 
role in major decision making about household matters, such as 
financial, social, childrearing decisions; and using jealousy as an 
excuse. 
• Economic abuse.  Examples include, but are not limited to, 
preventing the victim from getting or keeping a job, making her 
ask for money, making her live on an allowance, taking her 
money, denying the victim access to family resources or income, 
or causing disruptions at her workplace that result in her losing 
her job. 
• Coercion and threats.  Examples include, but are not limited to, 
forcing the victim to perform illegal acts, making the victim drop 
charges against the abuser, or forcing the victim to have sex. 
 
202 These evidentiary categories are based on the “Power and Control Wheel,” 
describing the eight areas of control the abuser exercises over the victim.  Power and 
Control Wheel, supra note 34. 
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The Uniform Probate Code section I propose is new in the context 
of inheritance law, but would not be the first example of a legal 
regime seeking to define and punish the exercise of coercive 
control.203  Civil remedies statutes in some states have sought to 
identify the elements of coercive control as the basis for civil 
protection orders: one of the most applicable is Delaware Code 
Annotated title 10, section 1041(1)(g), which recognizes false 
imprisonment or coercion, defined as  
compel[ling] or induc[ing] a person to engage in . . . or to abstain 
from engaging in conduct in which the victim has a legal right to 
engage, by means of instilling in the victim fear [of] . . . physical 
injury . . . damage to property, conduct constituting a crime, 
[accusation] of a crime . . .  subject[ing] some person to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, . . . provid[ing] information or withhold[ing] 
testimony . . . with respect to another’s legal claim or defense, . . . 
abus[ing a person’s] position as a public servant . . . , or 
perform[ing] any other act which is calculated to harm another 
person materially with respect to that person’s health, safety, 
business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal 
relationships.204 
This statute, and the few others like it that provide civil remedies for 
psychological as well as physical abuse, offer models for defining the 
type of behavior that would bar inheritance under the proposed 
regime.  Further, at least one scholar has drafted a model statute 
which explicitly criminalizes coercive control, defined as a “pattern of 
domestic violence,” in turn defined as “the commission of two or 
more incidents of assault, harassment, menacing, kidnapping, or any 
sexual offense, or any attempts to commit such offenses . . . against 
the same intimate partner.”205 
The draft provision is as follows: 
 
203 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2010); D.C. CODE § 16-1001 (2010); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (2010); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 (West 2010).  For a discussion of these statutes, see Margaret 
E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence 
Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1133–34 (2009). 
204 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 791–92 (West 2010). 
205 Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An 
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 602 (2007) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
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EFFECT OF COERCIVE SPOUSAL ABUSE ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION, 
WILLS, JOINT ASSETS, LIFE INSURANCE, AND BENEFICIARY 
DESIGNATIONS. 
Definitions: 
Under this section 
“Spousal abuse” shall mean a pattern of physical assault or 
threats of physical assault, and/or emotional abuse imposed on the 
victim by the abuser, in which the victim is in constant fear of the 
abuser, in which various aspects of the victim’s daily life are subject 
to surveillance and control by the abuser, and in which the victim is 
compelled, through fear of the abuser, to perform acts that he or 
she otherwise would not have performed, or to fail to perform acts 
that he or she would have otherwise performed, all of which were 
acts performed with the intent to gain power or control over the 
victim.  Evidence of spousal abuse may include, but is not limited 
to: 
– a pattern of isolation of the decedent spouse during her his or 
life from friends, family, coworkers; 
– a pattern of controlling the decedent’s movements, such as 
preventing the decedent from going to work, leaving the house, 
denying access to car, phone or internet, mail; 
– a pattern of physical and/or sexual assaults used to control the 
decedent’s behavior; 
– a pattern of control of the decedent’s finances, such as forcing 
the decedent to turn over paychecks, bank accounts, and other 
assets to the abuser; 
Spousal abuse under this Act shall not include: isolated, situation-
specific physical altercations that arise in response to specific 
conflicts and in which neither party is fearful enough to seek outside 
assistance and in which there is no serious resulting injury. 
(a) Under this section, a preponderance of evidence of spousal 
abuse shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the decedent’s 
will, a part of the decedent’s will, and any nonprobate transfers 
benefitting the surviving spouse, are the products of duress and 
should be denied probate.  A preponderance of the evidence of 
spousal abuse shall raise a rebuttable presumption that the 
surviving spouse is barred from intestate succession to the estate 
of the decedent spouse. 
(b) A surviving spouse who fails to rebut the presumption 
raised by evidence enumerated in this section is proven to have 
engaged in spousal abuse of the decedent and is not entitled to 
any benefits under the will or under this Article, and the estate of 
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decedent passes as if the abuser had predeceased the decedent.  
Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the 
benefit of the abuser passes as if the abuser had predeceased the 
decedent. 
(c) Any joint tenant who fails to rebut the presumption raised by 
evidence enumerated in this section is proven to have engaged in 
spousal abuse of the other joint tenant and thereby effects a 
severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the 
decedent passes as his property and the abuser has no rights by 
survivorship.  This provision applies to joint tenancies [and 
tenancies by the entirety] in real and personal property, joint and 
multiple-party accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, 
credit unions and other institutions, and any other form of co-
ownership with survivorship incidents. 
(d) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or 
other contractual arrangement who fails to rebut the 
presumption raised by evidence enumerated in this section is 
proven to have engaged in spousal abuse of the principal 
obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not 
entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other 
contractual arrangement, and it becomes payable as though the 
abuser had predeceased the decedent. 
(e) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the abuser 
shall be treated in accordance with the principles of this section. 
(f) Police reports and hospital records may constitute evidence of 
spousal abuse under this section, the sufficiency of which is to be 
determined by the court. Other evidence under this section may 
include: testimony of relatives, friends, neighbors and coworkers, 
testimony of expert witnesses in the areas of spousal abuse and 
victim advocacy. 
(g) This section does not affect the rights of any person who, 
before rights under this section have been adjudicated, purchases 
from the abuser, for value and without notice, property that the 
abuser would have acquired except for this section, but the 
abuser is liable for the amount of the proceeds or the value of the 
property.  Any insurance company, bank, or other obligor making 
payment according to the terms of its policy or obligation is not 
liable by reason of this section unless prior to payment it has 
received at its home office or principal express written notice of a 
claim under this section. 
Several features of this provision strive to avoid false positives.  First, 
it contains an intent requirement.206  Some authors have rejected an 
 
206 For discussions of the pros and cons of an intent requirement in civil statutes 
defining domestic violence, see Burke, supra note 205, at 604–11 (arguing that the mens 
rea requirement correctly places the focus on the batterer rather than on the resulting 
psychological state of the victim).  But see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and 
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intent requirement when drafting model criminal laws against 
coercive control on the basis that such a requirement creates too high 
an evidentiary hurdle;207 I include such a requirement because it does 
create a significant evidentiary burden, which, in probate cases, will 
provide reassurance against the finding of false positives.  Such a 
requirement will reassure critics that such behaviors as extreme 
nagging, frequent arguing, and mutual physical altercations, will not 
fall under the ban’s purview.  The intent requirement also has the 
advantage of shifting the inquiry to the alleged abuser,208 who in 
many cases will be available for questioning, and away from the 
victim, who will not be available, and it will also provide a context 
for any nonphysical crimes against the victim. 
The standard of evidence required for a finding under this section 
is a preponderance of the evidence, the same standard that applies in 
other will contests under undue influence, fraud, capacity, etc.  The 
scope of admissible evidence, however, must be wider than that 
previously proposed in this context: Robin Preble, for example, would 
limit the evidentiary inquiry to the civil and criminal records of the 
beneficiary spouse.209  The problem with this limitation is that a large 
percentage of cases of domestic abuse are not reported to police and 
thus never make their way into the court system, even to the extent of 
restraining orders.210  Certainly, if civil and criminal records exist, 
they are highly dispositive.  The extent of the underreporting of 
abuse, however, necessitates the inclusion of evidence other than 
court records to reduce the number of false negatives that court 
records would allow. 
It is possible that an abuse victim, rather than calling the police, 
has at some point confided in friends, relatives, and coworkers.  Thus, 
testimony of such people should be admitted. Expert witnesses, 
specifically, Victim’s Advocates, paid for by the Probate Court, 
should also be heard.  Victim’s Advocates are civilians trained to 
detect and recognize evidence of coercive control.  The Advocate in a 
 
Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 959, 995–96 (2004) (rejecting an intent requirement in a criminal statute 
because of what she determined to be its creation of too high an evidentiary hurdle). 
207 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 206. 
208 Burke, supra note 205, at 605–11. 
209 Preble, supra note 31, at 414–15. 
210 Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (last visited Sept. 
25, 2011). 
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probate case would seek out and interview coworkers, friends, and 
relatives of the decedent to find out whether she had ever confided in 
any of them any evidence that she was the victim of coercive control. 
An important function of the Advocate’s investigation would be to 
eliminate false positives.  A false positive could arise in a situation in 
which there was a single reported incident of violence between 
spouses but no evidence of a pattern of coercive control relevant to 
the statute.  The Advocate would look for an ongoing pattern of 
behavior over the entire term of the relationship rather than isolated 
instances, which would not fall under the definition of coercive 
control.  For example, interviewers would screen for the evidence that 
the decedent experienced fear and was the victim of controlling 
behavior as well as—or even rather than—just violence.211  Rather 
than relying on individual instances, the investigation would assess 
the relationship among all the incidents and their connection to assess 
whether they formed a pattern of behavior that fit the coercive control 
mode1.212 
This proposal would discourage false positives much more 
effectively than do other doctrines underpinning will contests.  I have 
argued elsewhere for the abolition of the will contest doctrine of 
undue influence, partly because of its tendency to yield questionable 
findings of the existence of undue influence.  The Johnson & Johnson 
case I cited earlier illustrates how much less amenable to false 
positives is my evidentiary regime here.  Had the contestants 
challenged the will on the grounds of spousal abuse, adherence to the 
evidentiary requirements put forth here would have made the case 
much clearer.  The evidence that the wife, Basia Johnson, had 
exercised coercive control over her husband would have consisted of 
the allegations in fact made in the case, that she verbally abused her 
husband, threw tantrums and even, on occasion, struck him.  This 
evidence, as well as the clear bias of a corrupt probate judge, 
eventually persuaded the proponents to settle the case.  The evidence 
at bar, however, would have been much less convincing as dispositive 
of coercive control.  There was no evidence that Basia was successful 
in surveilling or controlling any significant aspect of her husband’s 
life; indeed, her tantrums seem to have expressed her sense of a lack 
 
211 STARK, supra note 4, at 366 (discussing screening programs in Scotland and England 
that look “for fear and control as well as [physical] violence”). 
212 Preble, supra note 31, at 415 (noting the importance of a statute that does not allow 
“relatively minor or isolated and remote instances of abuse . . . to deprive a beneficiary of 
his . . . property interest in the decedent's estate”). 
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of control as much as anything else.213  There was no evidence of 
threats to herself or others, no destruction of Seward’s belongings, no 
pattern of coercion in any aspect of his life.214  Seward seemed 
simply to ignore her outbursts.215  In the context of coercive control, 
the psychiatric testimony offered might have been decisive instead of 
merely eliciting sarcasm from the judge: Dr. Herbert Spiegel, of 
Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, testified that Seward controlled all 
the areas of his life that were important to him, from his financial 
dealings to the arrangement of items on his bedside table.216  
Although the evidence in the case showed that there was verbal abuse 
and violence, it would not have fit the evidentiary regime required to 
show coercive control that I have set forth here—and rightly so. 
B.  Standing 
A further issue is standing.  The standing rules in will contests 
allow only interested parties to challenge a will’s validity:217 this 
means that only a person who stands to gain from the will or under 
intestacy is able to bring suit.  In other words, the person bringing the 
challenge has to stand to gain by the will, or a part of the will, being 
denied probate.  This is problematic in the coercive control scenario.  
The people most likely to have this kind of standing are other family 
members, such as children of the deceased, but children from abusive 
homes have complex and often counterintuitive reactions to the abuse, 
sometimes denying that it took place.218  Children who grow up in 
abusive homes often learn that violence in intimate relationships is 
not only acceptable but also normal, and thus do not identify the 
behavior they witnessed as aberrant.219  When called upon to testify 
about the behavior, they may refuse to label it as domestic violence or 
 
213 MARGOLICK, supra note 165, at 577. 
214 Id. at 576–77. 
215 Id. at 575. 
216 Id. 
217 Children of DV Statistics, ADVOCATES AGAINST FAM. VIOLENCE, http://dv 
services.tripod.com/id24.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).  
218 Children of DV Statistics, ADVOCATES AGAINST FAM. VIOLENCE, http://dv 
services.tripod.com/id11.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (“Children from abusive homes 
show a shocking lack of ability to empathize with other's problems or needs.  They 
become desensitized to abuse.  A horrifying experience for one child may be something 
very minor to someone who has lived around abuse, mistreatment, and foul language all of 
their lives.”). 
219 MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 326 (2003) (saying that children who 
witness abuse learn that it’s OK to use violence on those one loves). 
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coercive control.  In cases in which the couple had children, these will 
be the only people who might benefit from the will being denied 
probate or the barring of intestate heirs, and thus the only people with 
standing.  I propose to keep the existing standing rules in place 
despite their limitations; however, in many cases, they will still allow 
for dispositive testimony, and expanding them might invite baseless 
accusations from parties not closely associated with the decedent. 
C.  Hearsay 
The evidence I propose to allow under this provision would include 
the kind usually classified in civil and criminal proceedings as 
hearsay—that is, statements of a party not present in court offered for 
the truth of the matter those statements assert.220  I have suggested 
that the court admit the testimony of friends, family members, and 
coworkers about statements the decedent made that might prove or 
rebut allegations of spousal abuse.  Hearsay is normally excluded 
from civil and criminal proceedings, but evidentiary rules in probate 
courts are generally more flexible and discretionary.221  About ten 
states, however, still have a form of probate hearsay rule called the 
Dead Man’s rule, which bars an “interested party”—that is, someone 
who stands to gain from a challenge to the will—from testifying as to 
statements the decedent made when alive.222  The definition of 
“interested party” varies from state to state, and is debatable at the 
outer edges of the term, but generally refers to someone who would 
gain from a will or part of a will being denied probate, or who would 
gain under intestacy if the surviving spouse were barred from 
inheriting. 
Some of the testimony I propose would not be barred under the 
Dead Man’s rule, coming as it would from coworkers and friends, 
who would probably not stand to gain under the will or intestacy of 
the decedent and thus not qualify as “interested parties” unless they 
claimed to be beneficiaries under a prior will that was revoked in 
 
220 FED. R. EVID. 801. 
221 See generally Wesley P. Page, Dead Man Talking: A Historical Analysis of West 
Virginia’s Dead Man’s Statute and a Recommendation for Reform, 109 W. VA. L. 
REV. 897 (2007) (discussing cases that employed a more flexible hearsay rule for probate 
cases). 
222 For discussions of the Dead Man’s rule, see generally id.; Shawn K. Stevens, 
Comment, The Wisconsin Deadman’s Statute: The Last Surviving Vestige of an 
Abandoned Common Law Rule, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 281 (1998); Ed Wallis, An Outdated 
Form of Evidentiary Law: A Survey of Dead Man's Statutes and a Proposal for 
Change, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75 (2005). 
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favor of the surviving spouse.  Other witnesses, however, might be 
barred in states with such a rule.  The Dead Man’s rule has received 
criticism from every quarter: evidence scholars attack it as being 
unnecessary and far more likely to bar truthful evidence about valid 
claims than to eliminate false ones.  As a historical matter, the rule is 
the vestige of the old common-law bar to interested witnesses 
testifying in any proceeding, a rule which was abolished by the 
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972,223 and, which the 
American Bar Association referred to “as an anachronism and an 
obstruction to truth.”224  In this context, my proposal offers further 
support for the movement to abolish this rule in the few states that 
still enforce it.  Spousal abuse is a clear example of a situation in 
which allowing testimony of parties who may be interested in the 
estate offers the opportunity to discover truth.  Another alternative is 
to allow probate courts to make an exception to the Dead Man’s rule 
for cases in which spousal abuse is alleged. 
Moreover, much evidence in these cases could take forms other 
than spoken testimony subject to Dead Man’s rules.  Such evidence 
might include: bank account records, titles to cars and other tangible 
objects and real property as well as records of transfers of property, 
phone and e-mail records, credit card records, and records showing 
absences from work. 
D.  Danger of False Positives 
I suggest that there is little danger of false positives in the scheme I 
have outlined.  Indeed, the real danger lies in the virtual certainty 
of false negatives.  As numerous experts in the field have noted, 
batterers are gifted dissemblers, expert at hiding their abuse from the 
outside world, relatives, and friends.225  Batterers’ denial of their 
actions is so profound that they deny their actions to themselves.226  
They are talented at presenting themselves to people outside the home 
as “nice guys.”  One observer commented that “[h]e murdered his 
 
223 See FED. R. EVID. 601 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules). 
224 Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 ANN. REP. 
A.B.A. 570, 581 (1938). 
225 See generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND 
CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); Erin Street Mateer, Comment, 
Compelling Jekyll to Ditch Hyde: How the Law Ought to Address Batterer Duplicity, 48 
HOW. L.J. 525 (2004). 
226 Mateer, supra note 225, at 528 (noting that the batterer “shield[s] himself from his 
conscience by denying the battering to himself”). 
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wife . . . you would have never believed it . . . he was the nicest 
guy.227  More than one battered women’s advocate has used the 
phrase “Jekyll and Hyde” to describe the changes in the batterer’s 
personality.228  Victims have observed that “[h]is friends never see 
the other side of him; they think he’s just a nice guy, just one of the 
boys.”229  Batterers carefully regulate their behavior in public, 
needing to cultivate a positive image among their peers to maintain 
their positive image of themselves.230 
Cultural stereotypes support batterers’ duplicity and will also 
contribute to false negatives in the probate context.  American 
popular culture tends to associate domestic violence with lower 
classes and minorities—thus, ironically, aiding and abetting the 
duplicity of batterers in upper class families where the testamentary 
disposition of resources is more likely to be an issue.231  Other 
stereotypes and cultural norms that support the covering up of 
coercive control in a relationship are “the idealization of heterosexual 
romance, the normalization of aggressive masculinity, and the 
conception of women as property.”232  Idealization of heterosexual 
romance creates an atmosphere in which aspects of domestic violence 
are reconfigured as passion; cultural images representing women as 
objects allow possessiveness to appear “normal,” and well-publicized 
acts of partner abuse are relegated to minor status. 
In support of the above assertions, I offer three recent examples.  
First, the movie “Black Swan” depicts a young ballerina whose 
artistic “passion” is “awakened” through the repeated sexual assaults 
of her director.233  This example of popular culture teaches not only 
that sexual assault is romantic, but that it contributes to woman’s 
artistic and sexual growth.  Second, a Super Bowl commercial for 
AT&T: two young men sit in a ski lift.  One, holding his 4G phone, 
asks the other whether he minds if he asks out the other’s ex-
girlfriend.  His friend replies that he does not, because “we broke up 
six months ago,” but adds that he doesn’t think “she’d go for a guy 
 
227 Id. at 525. 
228 See, e.g., id.; DUTTON, supra note 225, at 53 (reporting that his notes from therapy 
sessions contain allusions to batterers as having Jekyll and Hyde personalities). 
229 DUTTON, supra note 225, at 53l; Mateer, supra note 225, at 525. 
230 Mateer, supra note 225. 
231 Id. at 546. 
232 Id. at 547. 
233 Black Swan, FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, http://www.foxsearchlight.com 
/blackswan/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). 
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like you.”  The first young man then texts the woman in question and 
receives an immediate reply saying that she has wanted him to ask her 
out “for over a year now,” and that she is looking forward to their 
date.  In a rage, the ex grabs the phone and throws it into the air.  The 
message here is also clear: women are property, to be passed back and 
forth through negotiations among men.  The ad also refigures a fairly 
violent act of possessiveness—throwing the phone off the ski lift—as 
humor, trivializing it and making it sympathetic.  Indeed, the 
comments on YouTube confirm that this was indeed the commercial’s 
not-so-subliminal message: one viewer wrote that he “would have 
thrown [the guy] off, not the phone,” and another commented “I guess 
she wanted him even when she was taken.”234 
Finally, David Carr pointed out in The New York Times that it was 
insulting Chuck Lorre, rather than his proven history of violence 
against women, that caused Charlie Sheen to be fired from his hit 
television comedy “Two and a Half Men.”235  Carr observed that 
“Hollywood has long had a soft spot for male misbehavior and, in 
claiming to parody childish misogyny, it seems to provide an excuse 
to indulge in it further.”236  In other words, shows like “Two and A 
Half Men” make misogyny look normal and even funny, and the 
result is that the natural byproduct of misogyny—violence—slides off 
the radar screen. 
The above examples are a few of many.  What they suggest is that 
popular culture normalizes and trivializes components of spousal 
abuse, thus making it disappear as an extreme form of behavior 
deserving of extreme sanction.  This process makes it more likely that 
any inquiry like the one I propose will result in many more false 
negatives than false positives. 
Another deceptive aspect of the coercive control relationship is that 
it cycles through three phases, at least one of which can appear 
innocuous to observers.237  These phases are: the tension-building 
phase, the battering phase, and the loving, contrite phase.238  Even the 
tension-building phase is hard for outsiders to discern as anything but 
 
234 Ski Lift Commercial, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6Pll7Qm-k0 
(last visited on Sept. 25, 2011). 
235 David Carr, Insulting Chuck Lorre, Not Abuse, Gets Sheen Sidelined, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2011, at B1. 
236 Id. 
237 On the cycles of intimate abuse, see generally DUTTON, supra note 225, at 53–68; 
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). 
238 DUTTON, supra note 225, at 54. 
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moodiness brought on by outside events, and the contrition phase 
appears to be a time of extreme closeness and affection.239  In this 
phase, the batterer is contrite and loving.240  He promises to get help, 
never to be violent again, he brings the victim gifts and tells her she 
is the only person who can save him and that he will kill himself if 
she leaves him.241  This part of the cycle can go on for long periods of 
time, and while it is going on, the relationship can look blissfully 
happy to outside observers.  The cyclic nature of the violence makes 
false negatives even more likely: observers during the quiet first and 
the peaceful third phase of the cycle will have no suspicions that there 
is any coercive control in the relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time that succession law made a statement about spousal abuse 
as it has about other forms of behavior like child abuse and spousal 
abandonment; it is also time that succession law began to rectify some 
of the property wrongs brought about by spousal abuse.  Indeed, as it 
now stands, succession law makes the statement that it “respects and 
privileges” children and abandoned spouses and that it “ignores and 
disadvantages” abused spouses.  This is unacceptable.  The regime of 
law by which property is passed at death has always been a forum for 
the expression—and enforcement—of social values, and it needs to 
extend that function to coercive control in intimate relationships.  We 
as a society need to acknowledge that coercive control constitutes 
invalidating duress in the context of wills, and that abusers should be 
barred from succeeding to the estates of their victims under intestacy. 
 
239 Id. at 57 (noting that during this phase the batterer seeks to woo back the victim; 
“[h]e promises to reform . . . to get counseling, to join Alcoholics Anonymous . . . [to] 
never be violent again . . . [t]emporarily she is given all the relationship power”). 
240 Id. 
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